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Abstract
We study analytically and numerically Minsky instability as a combination of top-down, bottom-up
and peer-to-peer positive feedback loops. The peer-to-peer interactions are represented by the links of a
network formed by the connections between firms; contagion leading to avalanches and percolation phase
transitions propagating across these links. The global parameter in the top-bottom – bottom-up feedback
loop is the interest rate. Before the Minsky Moment, in the ‘Minsky loans accelerator’ stage the relevant
“bottom” parameter representing the individual firms’ micro-states, is the quantity of loans. After the
Minsky Moment, in the ‘Minsky crisis accelerator’ stage, the relevant ‘bottom’ parameters are the number
of ponzi units / quantity of failures / defaults. We represent the top-bottom, bottom-up interactions on a
plot similar to the Marshall-Walras diagram for quantity-price market equilibrium (where the interest rate
is the analog of the price). The Minsky instability is then simply emerging as a consequence of the fixed
point (the intersection of the supply and demand curves) being unstable (repulsive). In the presence of
network effects, one obtains more than one fixed point and a few dynamic regimes (phases). We describe
them and their implications for understanding, predicting and steering economic instability.
1 Requisiteness of the agent based and network approach
1.1 Background on Minsky theory of instability
Minsky’s theory of instability has as a central element the procyclical self-reinforcing feedback loop between
the individual behavior of economic players and the state of the economic system as a whole. This explains
the fact that in spite of his brilliance and in spite of the personal admiration by many of his peers, for a
long time, Minsky’s work could not be absorbed within the mainstream economic theory [Wray 2011a].
Indeed there are a series of crucial features in the Minsky instability theory which are incompatible with
the neo-classical framework:
1. the relationship between the individual and the macroscopic behavior cannot be expressed in a
framework where both the system and the individuals are fused into a representative agent by
simply ignoring aggregation concerns.
2. the positive feedback loop between the system as such and the agents composing it, leads to a
dynamics which instead of approaching equilibrium, as assumed by the neo-classical approach, runs
away from it. Departures from the equilibrium, instead of being corrected by the forces within the
economic system, are, in Minsky’s theory, exacerbated until a Minsky moment takes place and from
then on, new divergence from equilibrium takes place in the opposite direction. Thus, as observed
by Minsky [Minsky 1975], in a capitalist economy, stability is destabilizing and thus impossible.
3. Minsky divided the companies into 3 classes:
- Hedge - companies that are entitled to enough cash flow to completely pay their debts including
their interest,
- Speculative - companies that are only entitled to enough cash flow to serve their interest pay-
ments,
- Ponzi - companies that do are not entitled to enough cash flow to pay interest on their loans.
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This classification (see below for their formal definitions in Eqs. 1-4 and the associated text) requires
an explicit representation of the companies and their dynamics in terms of a multi-agent system in
which the processes take place by long chains of action and reaction between the various players. In
fact the dynamic motion of companies forth and back between Hedge, Speculative, Ponzi and failed
positions is at the very heart of the Minsky instability.
Thus Minsky had to construct his thinking on the basis of previous work that offered alternatives to
the homogeneous, equilibrium, representative agent [Kirman 1992]:
a. Keynes’ expectation dynamics under uncertainty .
b. Hayek’s emphasis of the role of individuals in driving macroeconomic behavior.
c. Schumpeter’s theory of innovation followed by creative destruction [Schumpeter 1936][Biondi 2008].
Minsky exposed his early views in a book entitled John Maynard Keynes [Minsky 1975]. Rather than
attempting therein a scientific biography of Keynes, he used the Keynesian conceptual framework to
emphasize the non-equilibrium, dynamical character of the economy and in particular the crucial role of
uncertainty and individual subjective expectations in inducing fast changes in prices, values, production
and employment. Following Keynes [Keynes 1937], Minsky endeavored to avoid in this way the difficulties
that Hayek feared in deducing the dynamics of the economic system out of the behavior of individual
agents. Hayek believed that in the absence of detailed information at the single agent and single transaction
level, it would be impossible to deduce and even less to control, the emergence of market prices and
dynamics. One critical issue in this debate has been coordination: Hayek renewed the classical wisdom
that coordination of individual plans is impossible for a central planner, leaving coordination only to
market(s), while Keynes and others argue against this received wisdom.
In Hayek, the only collective dimension is performed through the market, while Keynes introduced
non-market coordination by governmental action among others. Keynes’ choice was to represent the
macroscopic dynamics independently of an explicit microeconomic foundation. This was as a natural
choice as the physicists’ choice (e.g. [Carnot 1890]) to use macroscopic thermodynamic concepts at a time
when their atomic-molecular foundations were not yet available, neither empirically nor methodologically.
Obviously, this comes at a price: the non-equilibrium aspects and the detailed description of the space
and time transitions between various regimes are outside the reach of such a macro theory. Yet, as in
the case of Carnot who devised thermal engines based only on macroscopic facts (e.g. that increasing
temperature increases pressure) [Keynes 1937] was able to devise monetary and fiscal policies by which
the economy regulators could steer the economic system out of depression and into full employment. He
also described how these interventions can cause the growth or the transformation of the entire system.
Thus, for crude macro-policy interventions in acute crisis conditions, Keynes’ attempts to circumvent the
issue of micro-economic foundations was justified. Hayek’s despair of achieving a meaningful aggregation
with the experimental and theoretical means of his time was justified as well.
Unfortunately this left the economic field largely at the mercy of naive aggregation in terms of rep-
resentative agents which merely substituted the emergent complex collective dynamics by a copy of the
mechanical behavior of a microeconomic ideal agent (additionally defaced by the assumptions of rational-
ity, perfect knowledge or even perfect foreknowledge (cf. rational expectations theory [Lucas 1972])).
Minsky was left in the distinguished, but very limited, company of a minority that recognized bounded
rationality [Simon 1997], non-equilibrium [Schumpeter 1928] and heterogeneity [Kirman 1992]. Most of
the field continued to believe in Say’s wealth conservation, Walras equilibrium pricing, money neu-
trality and to ignore the role of debt financed investment. As recognized already by Minsky’s teacher
[Schumpeter 1936], and by an increasing tide in the current literature (see e.g. [Biondi 2008]) the debt
financed investment is a crucial factor in the capitalist economy. Unfortunately the mainstream economy
had no place for Minsky’s disequilibrium ideas and no way to internalize this concepts: in the neoclassical
frame of mind loans are just transfering the funds from individuals with less need for cash to individuals
with more need for cash and are irrelevant at the macroeconomic level. One of the ambitions of the
present paper is to express those Schumpeter-Minsky instability ideas in a format familiar from the study
of equilibrium economic systems.
1.2 Role of solvable agent based models in the study of unstable economic systems
The novel capabilities to gather data at the resolution of individual agents and individual transactions
as well as the statistical mechanics, field theory and complexity tools to extract non-trivial collective
dynamics out of large sets of individual interactive agents, allow students at the present time to go
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beyond the positions that deny, in principle, the possibility for the regulators to steer the macroeconomic
behavior. The original position expressed by Hayek, that there is no hope of reliably deducing from the
myriads of microscopic acts a meaningful macroscopic collective dynamics, can be now re-evaluated. In
the present paper we propose a way to re-address, from a positive perspective, the emergence of the
macroeconomic collective phenomena from microeconomic individual interactions. We argue that the
feature that can guide and give coherence and (to a degree) reproducibility to the connection between the
micro and macro scales is autocatalyticity: the non-trivial structure of feedback loops that amplify the
microeconomic individual events to systemic changes and reshape in turn individual behavior, according
to the macroeconomic state.
In the last decade, the research bridging between the microeconomic basis and the emergent macroe-
conomic phenomena led to significant breakthroughs beyond the naive assumption that a collective of
microscopic agents would behave as a single representative agent with properties similar to the typical
individual. This has been discussed in the book “Microscopic Simulation of Financial Markets. From
Investor Behavior to Market Phenomena” [LLS 2000]. However, initially the impression was created that
the agent based models are tractable only by numerical methods, as can be seen from the comment of
Harry Markowitz [Mark 2000]:
“Microscopic Simulation of Financial Markets points us towards the future of financial
economics. If we restrict ourselves to models which can be solved analytically, we will be
modelling for our mutual entertainment, not to maximize explanatory or predictive power.”
In fact the name “agent based modeling” became identified in the literature (mistakenly as we argue
below) with computer simulations. The implicit hope in such a position was that using agent based
models, which have all the necessary details at the microscopic level, the mechanisms and processes that
govern the emergence of macroeconomic phenomena will reveal themselves in a direct and self-evident
way. It might have been the case even that the mysterious invisible hand (as well as its trembling in
market frictions and failures) would emerge from the multitude of individual actions and agents coor-
dinated by market(s) and become visible in their simulations’ visualization and / or in their theoretical
analysis. In particular, the access by modern electronic communication and information processing to
the individual acts composing the global economic activity might have circumvented the difficulties that
Hayek perceived at his time as forbidding the possibility to access and analyze the immense number of
economic acts that compose the systemic economic dynamics. Those hopes were based on the success of
similar scenarios played out during the last century in various other fields and notably in Physics. In the
past it had been customary in many disciplines to formalize a collective of many similar objects in terms
of a “mean field” or a “representative agent” characterized by the average of their individual properties
and behavior. In reality such collectives may possess completely new properties and behavior than their
components. In turn, they often constitute the elementary objects of a higher level of organization. The
representative agent, mean field, continuum, linear way of thinking missed the higher level/order effects
that are responsible for the emergence of life from chemistry, conscience from life, society from conscious
individuals, etc [Holland 1992], [Lovelock 1979], [Gell-Mann 1994], [Prigogine 1997]. Understanding this
connection between the elementary objects of one science and the collective phenomena overarching them
allowed scientists to achieve many syntheses and insights and to overcome the obstacles that kept the
classical sciences as isolated sub-cultures. Thus the possibility to go both empirically and theoretically
to the individual economic agent level seemed a great opportunity to repeat in the economics field the
great successes that physics achieved to understand the emergence of macroscopic phenomena and even to
describe the conditions in which the macroscopic systems switch from one regime to another (e.g. phase
transitions between solid and liquid or liquid and gas). A corresponding success in economics would be the
understanding of the abrupt transition from the euphoria state to the panic state with a Minsky moment
as the point of phase transition between the two.Richard Roll, former president of the American Finance
Association and one of the leading research authorities in finance, gave a very optimistic evaluation of
these prospects emerging from [Mark 2000]:
“This book contains the first fully comprehensive treatment of microscopic simulation in
Finance. The authors make a compelling case that this technique originally used in physics to
solve otherwise intractable problems, is destined to become a standard tool in finance.”
However it is not guaranteed that a method which worked well in the physical sciences applies with no
change to the social, biological and human sciences. According to the Popperian paradigm, a scientific
method has, on the one hand, to be able to make falsifiable statements: make nontrivial predictions that
can be confronted with the empirical data. And on the other hand, according to Popper, “science is the art
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of systematic simplification”: scientific understanding means reducing the explanations of a phenomenon
to a limited number of premises (Occam’s razor). The question is, whether this kind of oversimplification
does not compromise the possibility to both understand phenomena of interest, and make reliable predic-
tions. In the same way in which economists, witnessing a real life situation, might interpret it along very
divergent narratives, the mere representation of a system in all its ‘micro’ details in the computer will not
reveal automatically its salient features. In fact, a model with too many parameters to tune can predict
anything – and thus nothing. If one has myriads of microscopic features it is very difficult to know which
one is responsible for the macroscopic effects. By representing exactly in the computer a system, which
one doesn’t understand, one ends up with two systems that one doesn’t understand: the original one and
the computer model of it.
So, in order to validate complex, non-equilibrium theories such as Minsky’s, one has to look beyond
computer simulations of agent based models. Minsky’s ideas suggest a generic way out of this dilemma:
one should keep in the models only those individual features that are directly involved in the amplification
of micro to macro. In the sequel, various models will be introduced; these will include only microscopic
features involved in the process of amplification of microscopic individual events to macroscopic collective
features. In this way, one still obtains the macroeconomic effects and the capability of making macroeco-
nomic predictions applicable to policy recommendations, while not getting cluttered by the microscopic
noise and the myriad of parameters related to it.
Thus the present paper, beyond the effort in describing in a precise way the Minsky’s financial insta-
bility scenario and its implications, has an additional methodological ambition: to emulate the success
in the physics and the mathematics literature of treating multi-agent percolation processes by analytical
methods [Stauffer 1985], [Grimmett 1999]. In fact our main tool will be the crucial relation Eq. 34 that
relates analytically the density of susceptible agents in a network to the size of the contiguous clusters
that they form.
However, the relation Eq. 34 by no means reduces the agent based network model to a continuous one:
as in [Stauffer 1985], [Grimmett 1999], the discrete agent character will continue to show up in the large
fluctuations in many aspects affecting the predictions and policy recommendations pertinent to steering
the economic system. The discrete character of the agents is amplified in the phase transition parameter
ranges to large variability in:
- the fractal geometrical distribution of failures within the network of companies;
- the intermittent fluctuation in the time sequence of failures;
- the large non-self averaging variability between different realizations of the same or very similar
systems.
In the following sections we will describe in detail the application of autocatalytic processes to economic
systems.
2 Autocatalytic feedback mechanisms applied to economic systems
2.1 Background on Autocatalytic mechanisms
In modern terminology, Minsky’s proposal for understanding the instability and the crises of the complex
capitalist economy is to identify and characterize the autocatalytic loops that destabilize it. In particular
Minsky identified positive feedback loops that act between the global system level and its components at
various scales. These autocatalytic loops are the filters that sort out the individual level events that may
trigger a systemic catastrophe from those destined to drown in the noise of local, short lived perturbations.
This implies that most of phenomena that make it to the macroscopic/systemic level do present, and
are fuelled by, some kind of autocatalytic positive feedback loop. This fact was noticed in the past in
many occasions and disciplines but in the absence of specific mechanisms that could explain it, it was
often dismissed as incompatible with the ethos and ideology of scientific thinking. The ubiquity of such
occurrences in so many fields (markets, economies, social organization, life, ecology, conscience, creativity)
suggests an equally generic paradigm: in order to understand the emergence of collective behaviors in
macroscopic systems, one has to find among the myriads of interactions and rules that govern their
microscopic components, the ones that have the capability to generate autocatalytic feedback loops. It is
only a behavior associated with such a positive feedback and autocatalytic loop that has the chance to be
amplified to the macroscopic scale and to govern the system’s global dynamics.
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In a series of models starting from heterogeneous interacting agents it has been found, using analytical,
simulation and empirical methods, that indeed such positive feedback loops lead to the emergence of
adaptive collective objects that change completely the dynamics of the system [Levy 1994], [LLS 2000],
[Shnerb 2000], [Yaari 2009]. Thus, by generalizing the auto-catalysis concept one was able to explain how
random microscopic elements may self-organize spontaneously into highly resilient localized collective
objects and change dramatically the naively expected behavior of the system as a whole. Examples of
such generalized autocatalytic mechanisms are: iterative contagion of neighbors (or business partners),
proliferation (of successful entities under appropriate conditions), generation by such entities of the very
conditions that produce them (or makes them grow), interactions between various aggregation levels within
the system (individual events contributing to the general mood that encourage the further occurrence of
such events) [Dover 2009], [Malcai 1999], [Yaari 2008].
One is led to the conclusion that the generic criterion that separates phenomena doomed to remain
local and buried in the noise from phenomena destined to take over the system, is their positive feedback
potential in its many guises and forms. In order to understand, predict and steer systemic changes one has
to discover, identify and characterize the particular feedback loops that sustain and amplify them. These
positive feedback mechanisms select just those sustainable emergent collective structures that possess such
self-sustaining properties [Nowak 2010], [Cantono 2010]. The autocatalytic processes are responsible for
many of the sudden changes that threaten the climate, the environment ecology, the social order, or the
economic stability around the world. The emergence of new elements that trigger new autocatalytic loops
in the system may highly and rapidly destabilize the current state of the system. The new elements may
be attributed to external causes but often they are the unavoidable result of the intrinsic instability of
the system [Biondi 2008].
Reflexivity As mentioned above, the positive feedback / self-reinforcing loop – or the autocatalytic
feedback loop as we will name it from now on – are not new concepts; one could write an entire monograph
about their origins, history and the forms which they took at different times and places. One aspect, which
became pre-eminent due to its relevance in the context of the latest global crises, is reflexivity. Reflexivity
is a feedback loop between cause and effect in systems of self-conscious individuals. While the reflexivity
concept has been known more recently in the context of evolutionary economics [Nelson 1982] and of
rational expectations theory [Akerlof 2009], [Lodhia 2005] its roots are very old: The principle of reflexivity
was perhaps first enunciated by William Thomas [Thomas 1923], [Thomas 1928]: “the situations that men
define as true become true for them.” A particular aspect of reflexivity is the self-fulfilling prophecy – a
prediction /prophecy that causes itself to become true, due to the positive feedback between belief and
behavior. Karl Popper called the self-fulfilling prophecy the Oedipus effect [Popper 1976]:
“One of the ideas I had discussed in The Poverty of Historicism was the influence of a
prediction upon the event predicted. I had called this the ‘Oedipus effect’, because the oracle
played a most important role in the sequence of events which led to the fulfillment of its
prophecy. . . . For a time I thought that the existence of the Oedipus effect distinguished
the social from the natural sciences. But in biology, too — even in molecular biology —
expectations often play a role in bringing about what has been expected.”
George Soros is an active promoter of the relevance of reflexivity to economics. For Soros [Soros 1987],
if traders believe that prices will fall, they will sell – thus driving down prices, whereas if they believe
prices will rise, they will buy – thereby driving prices up. As exposed in [Soros 2008], the central idea in
his conceptual framework is
“that social events have a different structure from natural phenomena. In natural phenom-
ena there is a causal chain that links one set of facts directly with the next. In human affairs
the course of events is more complicated. Not only facts are involved but also the participants’
views and the interplay between them enters into the causal chain. There is a two-way con-
nection between the facts and opinions prevailing at any moment in time: on the one hand
participants seek to understand the situation (which includes both facts and opinions); on the
other, they seek to influence the situation (which again includes both facts and opinions). The
interplay between the cognitive and manipulative functions intrudes into the causal chain so
that the chain does not lead directly from one set of facts to the next but reflects and affects
the participants’ views. Since those views do not correspond to the facts, they introduce an
element of [social] uncertainty into the course of events that is absent from natural phenomena.
That element of uncertainty affects both the facts and the participants’ views.”
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[Merton 1968] describes the emergence of a typical bank run: One day, a large number of customers
come to the bank at once – the exact reason is never made clear, it could be a large statistical fluctuation.
Customers, seeing so many others at the bank, begin to worry. False rumors spread that something is
wrong with the bank and more customers rush to the bank to try to get some of their money out while
they still can. The number of customers at the bank increases which in turn fuels the false rumors of
the bank’s insolvency and upcoming failure, causing more customers to come and try to withdraw their
money. The rumor of insolvency caused a sudden demand of withdrawal of too many customers, which
could not be answered, causing the bank to become insolvent and declare bankruptcy. The rumoured
prediction of a collapse led to its own fulfillment.
2.2 Minsky’s scenario and the role of ponzi units
Following Keynes, Minsky made an important point that the expectations and their dynamics are the
strongest economic incentives and a driver for business cycles. Expectations play a central role in the
precipitation of the crisis, as well as in the creation of the conditions which characterize financial fragility.
According to Minsky’s theory of financial instability:
“Stability – even of an expansion – is destabilizing in that more adventuresome financing
of investment pays off to the leaders, and others follow.” [Minsky 1975]
In other words, during a prolonged period of prosperity, the positive expectations which initially were
resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy (“success breeds daring”), at some point start (exogenously or en-
dogenously) to be perceived – again in a self-fulfilling way (rationally justified or not) – as irrationally
exuberant [Schiller 2006]. Expectations start then to diverge from the manipulative capabilities of in-
dividuals and therefore result in some initial occurrences of failures and bankruptcies. Such individual
occurrences very rapidly lead to the change in expectations from positive to negative, triggering the pre-
cipitation of a crisis. The realization that the exuberance is irrational is not based on the microscopic
experience of each of the individuals but rather on a global view of the system which is not available
directly to the individuals. This explains the great delay and the unpredictable timing of the switch
between the exuberant and panic moods and consequently the dramatic and sudden characteristics of the
switch – the ‘Minsky moment’. In the year preceding the latest crisis, “the adventuresome financing of
investment” led to unprecedented levels of leverage.
Following Minsky, [Biondi 2013] classifies economic entities into Hedge, Speculative or Ponzi finance
positions using a cash-based financial analysis. He assumes that net cash flows from operations (cash
earnings) fully cover both the interest charges and principal repayments in hedge positions, but only the
interest charges in speculative positions, while they do not even fully cover the interest charges in ponzi
positions. Accordingly, one can say that there was a multitude of companies (especially financial institu-
tions) that, in search for increasing profits, became ‘speculative units’ before the crisis. Their financial
solvability depended on the possibility to collateralise assets or refinance positions to cover principal re-
payments, because their net cash flows from operations did not enable such repayment. More seriously,
those financial companies encounter, therefore, the risk of becoming ‘ponzi companies’: companies which
cannot service the interest on their loans from their inflows from operations (cash earnings or earnings
thereafter), being dependent on collateralisation, leveraging and market-dependent operations even to
satisfy interest charges. Occasionally we shall call such companies in short ‘ponzi’ (we offer our apologies
to the reader and to Mr. Ponzi [Ponzi 1935] for this crude short of hand).
Formally we define as ponzi a company which cannot pay the interest on its debt from its cash earnings
(earnings, hereafter):
earnings− debt× interest rate < 0. (1)
It would be useful in the next sections to use Eq. 1 to define the resilience r(n) of a company n as the
earnings to debt ratio.
resilience = r(n) =
earnings(n)
debt(n)
. (2)
With this definition, a company becomes a ‘ponzi unit’ at any moment if the interest rate increases to
such an extent that it exceeds the company’s resilience:
r(n) < i = interest rate. (3)
Thus the difference between the value of the resilience of a company and the current interest rate (‘distance
to ponzi status’),
DP (n) = r(n)− i (4)
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is a crucial indicator of the failure susceptibility of a company to changes in the global mood and in
particular in the interest rate.
The role of the Eqs. 3 and 4 is to connect the discrete qualitative conceptualization by the original
Minsky classification with the real life quantitative continuous heterogeneous parameterization of compa-
nies in terms of their resilience. While the companies’ resiliences take naturally values in a continuous
probability distribution, their comparison with the current interest rate, Eq. 3, provides a sharp criterion
which separates in a discrete way the class of ponzi companies from the rest. Of course, this criterion is
well defined at each given time. However, as described in detail in the next sections, the dynamics of the
interest rate (depending in turn on the individual companies’ dynamics through Eq. 23) is continuously
moving companies into and out of the ponzi status as part of the ‘Minsky accelerator’ dynamics.
In the present paper we will occasionally distinguish between ponzi companies and failed companies.
We will elaborate on this distinction as we progress in defining increasingly realistic models. The distinc-
tion is meant to reflect the empirical fact that many ponzi companies are not necessarily recognized as such
by the other companies nor by the system as such. A well know example of this was the Madoff scheme
where a ponzi unit acted for many years and it was treated as a perfectly healthy company. Only when
external factors affected the company adversely, did its ponzi status become known, which influenced in
turn the status of its creditors and the status of the system as such. Thus, in addition to the Minsky
classification Hedge, Speculative and Ponzi, we introduce the ‘failed’, status which is a ponzi which is
recognized and treated as such. In the same way as the ponzi status, the failed status may be reversible.
Typically we will consider that a ponzi becomes a failed unit by contagion, when one of its partners has
failed. Thus the differentiation between a simple ponzi and failed one is relevant in the network case when
each company (node) has only a limited number of partners (nodes directly connected to it, as described
in Sections 5 and 6).
In the case in which there are no network effects, as in Sections 3 and 4, one assumes that all companies
are connected, and there will be no effective difference between the ponzi and failed statuses: a company
will become failed as soon as it becomes ponzi. Thus in the non-network models of Sections 3 and 4,
the debt-deflation phase is described in terms of a simple feedback loop: the increase in the interest rate
causes many ponzi companies to fail which leads to an increase in the interest rate which in turn causes
more speculative companies to become ponzi and fail, thus closing the feedback loop.
In the network based ‘Minsky accelerator percolation model’ described in Section 4, the ponzi status
implies that the company is ‘susceptible”. More precisely, the company will fail iff any of its partners fails’.
Thus in the percolation model one differentiates between the ‘susceptible’ or ponzi status of a company
and the ‘contaminated’ or failed status, in which the company is recognized as ponzi by the system.
By ‘failure’ we do not necessarily mean bankruptcy, but rather serious distress and missed payments,
i.e. a failure of a company to pay its debt obligations (default) which leads to sanctions by creditors and
in particular to credit limitations by banks. The actions in the case of default could be the restructuring
of the debt (extension of the due date and haircut for the debt repayment and the modification of the
interest rate), or sometimes, the liquidation of all the assets. The mathematical relations connecting the
interest rate to the number of ponzi and failed companies and quantifying thereby the Minsky accelerator
will be introduced and discussed in Sections 4 and 5.
The ‘ponzi unit’ concept is crucial to Minsky’s theory of instability:
“An increase in the ratio of ponzi finance, so that it is no longer a rare event, is an indicator
that the fragility of the financial structure is in danger zone for a debt-deflation.” Minsky (1986)
This Minsky vision came to happen during the great recession only too often: companies that increased
their debt without increasing their earnings placed themselves in danger of becoming ponzi at the slightest
increase in the interest rate. This has been central to the global financial crisis and its explanation
(and suggested regulatory reforms) [Wray 2012], [Wray 2013]. Companies which incurred large leverage
decreased their resilience and had difficulties to withstand the credit crunch. The interaction between the
resilience in the macroeconomic context and the resilience of the microeconomic agent will be discussed
in the subsequent sections. In particular in Figure 13 we cast our phase diagram describing the system
susceptibility to a Minsky instability in terms of the density (fraction) of ponzi companies within the
economy.
In addition to the usual Minsky crisis accelerator introduced in Section 4, we will discuss in the Section
3.3 the Minsky loans accelerator that characterizes the ‘exuberance phase’.
In the present paper we will formalize and study in detail the Minsky financial accelerator feedback
loop by showing that there exists generically a critical fraction or density of ponzi companies above which
the system becomes unstable. Congenial efforts to formalize the effect of over-leveraging on the global
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financial crisis and the network effects in the dynamics of systemic risk were offered in many recent
works [Biondi 2005], [Stein 2011], [Adrian 2012]. In particular a model capturing these effects in a non-
equilibrium context was presented in [Biondi 2012]. An agent-based model of socio-economic interaction-
based phenomena and expectation formation (positive, negative or neutral) has been developed and studied
in [Hohnisch 2005]. In that model, the swings between various market moods are explained in terms of
the influence that the peer groups are exercising on each of their members. The approach of the collective
as an entity has been advocated also in [Cantono 2010], [Cantono 2012], [Biondi 2005], [Biondi 2010].
2.3 Connecting the Minsky Accelerator to the Marshall-Walras formalism
The price formation in neoclassical economics seems very distant or even contradictory to the kind of
Minsky accelerator dynamics described in the previous section. Yet, in the following section, we will
show that one can find formal connections which in turn might illuminate the kind of dynamics that
precedes the Minsky moment and which takes, in the first place, the system away from equilibrium. We
will treat the Minsky accelerator in a form that makes it quite similar to the Marshall-Walras formalism.
More specifically, in the basic supply-demand diagram, on the y axis, instead of the price we will use the
interest rate. The x axis will be different before and after the Minsky moment:
- before the Minsky moment on the x axis we will plot the quantity of loans (Figures 1(b), 2(b), 3(b));
- after the Minsky moment the x axis will represent the number of ponzi defaults (Figures 5(b), 6(b)).
These formal parallels might seem artificial (especially the second) but they will emerge naturally from
the mathematical processing of quite realistic assumptions.
This application of neoclassical concepts to Minsky’s ideas encounters two main obstacles that turn
out to be more idiosyncratic than real:
- using Marshall-Walras to describe run-away from equilibrium, rather then convergence to equilib-
rium;
- treating, in the Marshall-Walras formalism, the amount of loans and the loan defaults as a production
quantity.
Both items above seem at first sight to be in contradiction to the very basis of the neoclassical thinking:
- the very motivation for Walras to invent the ‘tatonnement’ procedure and the quite similar market
adjustments procedure by Marshall, was to substantiate Adam Smith’s insight that markets (prices
and quantities) are brought to equilibrium by an ‘invisible hand’. Using it to demonstrate crisis and
divergence from equilibrium seems the very opposite. It also seemingly goes against the ‘common
sense’ view which suggests that the prices of the goods which are produced in excess will fall and
the prices of the good for which demand is greater then supply, will rise.
- in the neoclassical thinking, money is not production commodity (only exchanged: Say’s law) and
even when new money is injected in an economy the reaction is (‘in the long term’) neutral (rational
expectations).
However one should not get the impression that there are no precedents in the economic literature to
the two ‘departures’ above:
- for using the market mechanisms to obtain run-away from free-market equilibrium:
1. the possibility, and in fact likelihood, that market equilibria can be unstable has been established
by Sonnenschein-Mantel-Arrow-Debreu [Arrow 1954]. within the neoclassical framework;
2. even the rational expectations idea has been introduced with the help of an example [Muth 1961];
of a divergence of the Walras procedure, which in fact happens for a very wide range of param-
eters;
3. Veblen has introduced ideas in which the increase in the price increases demand, while
4. the existence of economies with increasing returns (producing more costs less per product) has
long been recognized (see for example [Arthur 1994]);
5. the social positive feedbacks leading to herding and allowing demand to make large excursions
out of equilibrium have been considered (see for example [Kirman 2010] [LLS 2000] [Solomon 2000]).
- For treating money or loans as a product, there was significant resistance because the conservation of
money through the transactions within an economy has been one of the most efficient instruments to
obtain useful theorems and models, starting with Say, through Hicks’ model and within the rational
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expectations theories. However, the use of Walras-like price-quantity diagram for interest rates and
loans supply has been made in the past. For instance [Keen 2011] has emphasized that in addition
to income earned by selling goods and services (which primarily finances consumption of goods and
services and thus by and large conserves money), there exists the supply of money by banks in the
context of entrepreneurial debt (which primarily finances investment) and in the context of rising
ponzi debt (which primarily finances the purchase at increasing prices of existing assets).
A more significant departure from the neoclassical pattern is our analysis of the ‘Minsky crisis accel-
erator’ that takes place after the Minsky moment. The evolution of the ponzi density and the interest
rate during this period occupies the bulk of the present paper. We will show that their dynamics math-
ematically parallels the Marshall-Walras feedback loop where, in order to find the equilibrium state, one
equates:
- the price per product offered by the suppliers as a function of the quantity of supplied products,
with
- the price per product for which the demand by the clients equals the same quantity of products.
The model based on the feedback loop between interest rate and ponzi failures will assume not only the
autocatalytic loop between
- the bottom-up regulation (the influence of the quantity of ponzi companies on the interest rate
offered by the lenders) and
- the top-down feedback (the influence of the interest rate on the number of ponzi companies),
but it will also take into account the peer-to-peer interaction in terms of network effects. This will lead to
a nontrivial configuration of stable and unstable fixed points Figure 11 and to a correspondingly complex
phase diagrams as shown in Figures 12 and 13.
3 The Marshall-Walras price formation process applied to the interest rate
and loans volume
3.1 The Marshall-Walras equilibrium in a loans market with decreasing returns
In neoclassical market equilibrium analysis, the formalism for finding fixed (equilibrium) states and es-
tablishing whether they are stable has been belabored for a long time, starting with Marshall and Walras
and brought to mathematical perfection by Arrow-Debreu [Galor 2007]. In our case we are looking for
equilibria (and the dynamics leading towards or away from them) which result from the dynamics of the
interest rate. In the period preceding a Minsky moment, the relevant interaction is between the interest
rate, i, and the amount of loans outstanding, Nloans. In the period following the Minsky moment, the
relevant interplay is between the number of ponzis, Nponzi, and the interest rate, i.
Let us first apply to the debt or loans market the Marshall-Walras method for price formation. We
will discuss later its limitations and their important implications. The crucial assumptions are that:
- The amount of loans demanded by the debtors, Nloans, is a decreasing function of the interest rate,
i, that they have to pay:
Nloans(i) = (i/k)
−µ (5)
where k and µ are constants. This equation Eq. 5 implies that the number of loans increases as
the interest rate decreases. This connection is also at the basis of the Hansen-Hicks IS-LM model
of credit (money) supply. More precisely, the IS part of the model assumes that as the interest
rate decreases, even investments with modest returns become lucrative because they can still give
returns higher than the interest rate: one will do better by investing in a productive business than
in keeping the money in the bank. Conversely, by borrowing money at very low interest one will
gain even if one invests it in a modestly lucrative business. Thus the number of investments eligible
for loans increases as the interest rate decreases. As the increase in investments leads to an increase
in production (GDP) which establishes the neo-classical IS inverse connection between the interest
rate and the GDP.
- The interest rate, i, that the banks are charging is an increasing function of the amount of loans,
Nloans, they agree to supply. This is the famous law of decreasing returns. The argument is that
the banks are charging an increasing price if their lending capacity is stretched up to or even beyond
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their limits, thus incurring a higher risk of default. We will discuss the realism of this assumption
later. For the moment, we adopt this position and assume for definiteness that:
i(Nloans) = i0N
α
loans (6)
where i0 and α are constants.
The power laws in Eqs. 5 and 6 have both empirical and theoretical justifications:
- The square root rule of influence (corresponding to α = 1/2) has been argued in social psychology
by Wallacher and Nowak [Nowak 1998].
- While the square root impact of orders on prices (corresponding to α = 1/2) has been argued by
Farmer at al, see [Farmer 2006].
- A power law is the only functional form that is scale invariant. If the dynamics is not strongly
influenced by other scales, it is natural to assume a power law behavior. In particular, the scale
invariance can be connected in the context of pricing with the fact that the price behavior should
be invariant to the monetary unit in which it is measured (a form of ‘money neutrality’).
However the results in the present paper are more general then the details of the power functional forms
involved.
Marshall and Walras differed in the interpretation of the iterative procedure that may converge to
the equilibrium point. While for Walras the iterative ‘tatonnement’ (‘tweaking’, ‘groping’) towards an
equilibrium price, ifix, and an equilibrium level of production, Nfix, took place in virtual time t, Marshall
considered the approach of the equilibrium as a genuine process in real time, t, in which the supplier (in
our case, the lender) reacted to the excess demand (in our case, of loans) by modifying the price (in our
case, the interest rate) while the client (in our case, the debtor) reacted to the new price by modifying
the quantity demanded:
Nloans = Nt = (it/k)
−µ (7)
it+1 = i0N
α
t . (8)
The equations 7 and 8 define a ‘top-down’ – ‘bottom-up’ feedback loop as shown in Figure 1(a).
Starting from a certain initial interest rate, i0, and an initial quantity of loans, N0, one triggers a
‘tatonnement’ chain reaction:
N0
Eq.8−−−→ i1 Eq.7−−−→ N1 Eq.8−−−→ i2 · · ·Nt Eq.8−−−→ it+1 Eq.7−−−→ Nt+1 · · · (9)
This iterative process is represented graphically in Figure 1(b):
- each step Nt
Eq.8−−−→ it+1 is represented as a vertical arrow with x coordinate equal to Nt and ending
on the curve i(Nloans) given by Eq. 6;
- each step it
Eq.7−−−→ Nt is represented as a horizontal arrow with y coordinate equal to it and ending
on the curve Nloans(i) given by Eq. 5.
The equilibrium interest rate and loans quantity are then obtained as the common solution of the Eqs. 5
and 6, as seen in Figure 1(b):
ifix = (i0k
αµ)1/(1+αµ) (10)
Nfix = (k/i0)
µ/(1+αµ). (11)
In the Appendix A the exact evolution of Nt during this process is deduced:
Nt = Nfix[N0/Nfix]
(−αµ)t . (12)
According to Eq. 12, for αµ < 1, since the exponent (−αµ)t → 0 vanishes for t → ∞, Nt converges to
Nfix. Thus, the Marshall-Walras process, Eq. 9, visualized in Figure 1(b), leads to the evolution of the
number of loans, Nt, given by Eq. 12, which converges to the stable fixed point, given in Eq. 11.
For αµ > 1, Nt and i both diverge to infinity, somewhat similar to the fears of the banks after the
Lehman crash in September 2008. Yet, the convergence may still be achieved by modifying the details of
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(a) The macroscopic state of the system is expressed in terms
of credit availability, parameterized by the interest rate, i.
The top-down part of the regulatory feedback loop is re-
lated to Eq. 7: an increase in i leads to a decrease in the
demanded quantity of loans, Nloans. The decrease in the
demand, Nloans, leads, according to Eq. 8, to a decrease
in the price, i. In this case the resulting feedback loop has
a stabilizing effect on the loans market, as shown in Figure
1(b).
(b) Application of the Walras procedure shown in Fig-
ure 1(a) equalizing supply and demand for the case
where the product quantity is the amount of loans,
Nloans, and the price is the interest rate, i. The inter-
section point defines the equilibrium values Nfix and
ifix. For the case αµ < 1 the iterative application of
the Eqs. 5 and 6 converges to the equilibrium point
irrespective of the initial value. Graphically this con-
sists in iteratively drawing vertical arrows to obtain the
new it+1 from the previous Nt and horizontal arrows
to obtain the next Nt+1.
Figure 1: Figure (1(a), the Marshall-Walras convergence loop representing the interactions in the case of a loans
market with decreasing returns. Figure 1(b) represents the case when the parameters are such |αµ| < 1 so that the
i and N coevolution leads to convergence. In the Appendix A examples of both the convergent and the divergent
coevolution are shown.
the procedure. For instance, one could introduce smaller steps (say consisting of a fraction, s ) instead of
the full adjustment steps that overshoot the fixed point:
Nt = s(it/k)
−µ + (1− s)Nt−1 (13)
it+1 = s(i0N
α
t ) + (1− s)it (14)
Such solutions have been proposed in the past: [Kaldor 1934] (see especially pages 133-135) suggested
that the adaptation of Nt and it takes place in small (individual transactions) steps (price/production
stickiness) while [Muth 1961] assumed that the changes are performed by agents with foreknowledge or
‘rational expectations’. Another possibility could be:
it+1 = it + s(Nt −Nt−1)α. (15)
The models Eqs. 13 - 15 are genuinely time-independent Markov processes, unlike Eq. 8 where the
value of the interest rate at the beginning of the process, i0, is explicitly remembered throughout the
process. However, this is not a problem for our models: they represent human reactions to specific
events and moments, so singling out the initial value of the variables, i0 , N0, is quite natural. E.g. the
Minsky moment is definitely a memorable point of reference which the agents are quite naturally likely
to remember throughout the crisis evolution. Thus, we will not pursue the models of the type Eqs. 13 -
15 here and will rather concentrate on models of the type Eqs. 7, 8.
The analysis in the present subsection is a paradigm which we will repeat in the next subsections and
following sections, introducing increasingly realistic conditions. As envisaged in the general market equi-
librium analysis of Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu, in the systems that we will consider, the generalization
of the curves Eqs. 7 and 8 may have more (or less) than one intersection (common (Nfix, ifix) solution
of Eqs. 5, 6) and neither a unique equilibrium interest rate, ifix, nor even that the process stops at a
given amount of loans, Nfix, will be guaranteed. A quite involved phase diagram will eventually emerge
– Figure 12.
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3.2 The Marshall-Walras equilibrium in loans market with increasing returns
In the previous section it was assumed that α > 0. This corresponds essentially the law of decreasing
returns applied to the money market. It represents the assumption that the interest rate, i, charged by the
creditors increases with the quantity of loans, N , that they supply. While the law of decreasing returns is
often invoked in the neoclassical literature starting with Mills and Ricardo [Ricardo 1996], it applies less
and less in the current economic conditions [Arthur 1994]. While it was more difficult to produce more
apples from the same land area or to extract more coal from a mine that was already in use for some
time, it is often easier to produce a computer or a copy of a program after one has already produced many
units of it. However, the decreasing returns assumption is still often invoked in order to ensure market
equilibrium, as indeed turned out to be the case in Figure 1(b).
As in many other cases, in the case of loans, modern conditions are conducive to a law of increasing
returns: a bank that gave already many loans, has a lot of assets (the loans and their interest) which are
also diversified over many debtors. Thus it is well insured against occasional creditor defaults. Therefore,
it can afford to allocate more loans to more clients at lower interest rates. On the contrary, a bank with
few loans has less assets and less diversification and has to charge a higher interest rate in order to protect
itself against occasional defaults. Increasing returns has been recognized in the last decades both as a daily
occurrence in the empirical economic reality and also as a significant factor determining the departures
of the real life from neoclassical economic theory [Arthur 1994]. Moreover as detailed in [Biondi 2005]
bank entities differ from markets in a way that makes the banking sector one of the sectors most likely to
be affected by the factors leading to economies of scale because of its specific economic organization and
specific features:
- economies of knowledge (learning by doing, aggregating information from scale and variety of oper-
ations)
- overheads split across various clients (leading to diminishing average and marginal costs)
- implicit public guarantees for bigger entities (too big too fail), etc.
Thus, instead of Eq. 6 one is lead to study the case of a supply curve where the interest rate, i, decreases
with the quantity of loans, N :
i(Nloans) = i0N
−α
loans (16)
as exemplified in Figure 2(b). In the case of increasing returns, Eqs. 7 and 8 become:
Nt = (it/k)
−µ
it+1 = i0N
−α
t .
The process of their coevolution, iteratively over time, is:
N0
Eq.17−−−−→ i1 Eq.7−−−→ N1 Eq.17−−−−→ i2 · · ·Nt Eq.17−−−−→ it+1 Eq.7−−−→ Nt+1 · · · (17)
The amount of outstanding loans at any one time is (see Appendix B for the derivation):
Nt = Nfix[N0/Nfix]
(αµ)t , (18)
where the fixed point is defined as the intersection between the two curves, Eqs. 16 and 5:
Nfix = (k/i0)
µ/(1−αµ) (19)
ifix = (i0/k
αµ)1/(1−αµ). (20)
As opposed to the decreasing returns case (Eqs. 10, 11) the convergence condition αµ < 1 cannot be
circumvented by small step modifications of the type given in Eqs. 13, 14. Indeed, if αµ < 1 the Eq. 18
converges in the t → ∞ limit to Nfix since the exponent (αµ)t → 0. However for αµ > 1, instead of Nt
oscilating between 0 and ∞ , as in the previous case Eq. 12 where the exponent oscillated between +∞
and −∞, one has now a monotonic behavior because (αµ)t → +∞. Thus, if the initial point N0 is less
then Nfix, one has in Eq 18 a quantity less then 1 at the power∞ which converges to 0. On the contrary,
if N0 > Nfix, then one has in Eq. 18 a quantity larger then 1 at the power ∞ which diverges to ∞.
Thus we conclude that a genuine instability occurs at Nfix if the interest rate offered by the banks
decreases with the volume of loans Eq. 17 faster than the decrease in the interest rate sufficient to insure
an increase in the loans demand (αµ > 1), Eq. 7. This case is analyzed in the next subsection. The
difference between the stable and unstable loan market with increasing returns can be best understood
graphically by comparing Figures 2(b) and 3(b), where, on a double logarithmic scale graph:
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(a) The top-down part of the regulatory feedback loop is
related to Eq. 7: namely, an increase in i (top) leads to
a decrease in the demanded quantity of loans quantity, N
(bottom). The bottom-up effect is defined by Eq. 17: a
decrease in N leads to a further increase in i. The difference
in the thickness of the arrows in the drawing implies that
this interest rate regulations is slower than the increase in
loan demand (αµ < 1), and so the resulting feedback loop
has a stabilizing effect on the loans market.
(b) Coevolution of the parameters in the loop Figure
2(a): supply of loans N and demand i. For the case
αµ < 1, the process converges to the equilibrium point
(Nfix, ifix), marked by the intersection of the curves
Eqs. 5, 16. The convergence occurs irrespective of the
initial value of N0. Graphically such an iterative conver-
gence process 17 is represented by alternatively drawing
vertical arrows to obtain the new i from the previous
N and horizontal arrows to obtain the next N from the
current i.
Figure 2: The Marshall-Walras procedure for increasing returns to scale and slow top-down feedback, i.e. when the
cost of loans (interest rate, i) is a slowly decreasing function of the quantity of loans supplied, N .
- the function i(N) = i0N
−α is represented by a straight line of slope −α;
- while the function N(i) = (i/k)−µ is represented by a straight line of slope −1/µ because N corre-
sponds to the horizontal x axis while i is measured on the vertical y axis.
The evolution of the iterative process N(it) = (it/k)
−µ, it+1(Nt) = i0Nt−α is represented by arrows.
Following the arrows in Figures 2(b) and 3(b), one can see that:
- if −α > −1/µ, i.e. the slope of N(i) is steeper then the slope of i(N) the process converges to the
fixed point;
- if, on the contrary, the slope of i(N) is steeper then the slope of N(i), as in Figure 3(b), then the
fixed point is unstable (repulsive).
The generic condition for the convergence and stability of a fix point of a discrete dynamical system
is (cf. [Galor 2007]): ∣∣∣∣ ∂i∂N
∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣∂N∂i
∣∣∣∣ < 1. (21)
We will use this inequality in the rest of this paper and especially in obtaining the phase diagrams in the
non-linear case with multiple fixed points given by Figs. 11, 12; not only does this criterion help establish
the direction of the iterative process in the neighbourhood of the fixed points, but it also helps identify
the character and the evolution of the process in the entire parameter intervals between the fixed points.
In fact they correspond to the various phases (stable or unstable) of the system.
The formal convergence condition Eq. 21 is visually and more intuitively enforced in the various
diagrams of the type shown in Figure 2(b), by just following the arrows that represent graphically the
iterations of the process 17: horizontal arrows bring the process from it to the corresponding Nt while the
vertical arrows advance the process from Nt to it+1.
More specifically, in Figure 2(b) the chains of arrows are pointing towards the stable fixed point,
indicating that the process is converging towards it irrespective of on which side of it one starts. On
the contrary, in Figure 3(b) the chains of arrows point away from unstable fixed point such that starting
slightly above or below the fixed point, the distance to it increases as the process advances. Automatically
this means that the entire interval between two fixed points (e.g. Figure 11) has a uniform behavior – it
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constitutes one phase of the system; irrespective of where one starts within that interval, the process will
converge towards the stable fixed point and run away from the unstable fixed point.
3.3 The Rational of Irrational Exuberance
3.3.1 The Loans Accelerator
The Minsky vision of intrinsic instability has been perceived by both supporters and adversaries as incom-
patible with the mainstream neoclassical tradition. As in many other cases (Keynes, Schumpeter, etc.),
the incompatibility is mainly in the minds of the researchers rather than in the actual mathematical hard
core or the methodology. The instability is clearly singled out as the default rather then the outlier in the
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Arrow-Debreu analyses. Concentrating on the convergent cases is only a particular
choice which was (too) often made in the past. In the present sub-section we will use a Marshall-Walras
neoclassical-like analysis to substantiate Minsky’s point that instability is a natural condition for a capi-
talist regime. In fact to obtain it, one only has to consider the αµ > 1 case in the analysis of the previous
sub-section.
In this case, the process Eq. 17 diverges because in Eq. 18 the exponent, (αµ)
t
, instead of vanishing
for t→∞, diverges (αµ)t →∞. Thus
- for an initial N0 > Nfix, Eq. 18 implies Nt → ∞. Of course for a finite number of agents Ntotal,
the process 17 will rather stop at Nt = Ntotal
1.
- for an initial N0 < Nfix, Eq. 18 implies Nt → 0 .
Thus, in the case αµ > 1, the fixed point (Nfix, ifix) becomes repulsive. Graphically this is seen in
Figure 3(b), where, starting at points N0 very close to (slightly above or slightly below) Nfix, leads to Nt
(and it) evolving in opposite directions, towards 0 or ∞, respectively. Figure 3(a) illustrates visually the
autocatalytic feedback loop responsible for this instability in which the top-down feedback is dominant
(fat top-down arrow).
The implications for the loans market are disastrous: banks that dare to lend in an aggressive way
large quantities at low interest rate take over the market, while banks or financial sectors that take a more
conservative position are squeezed out of the market. It becomes rational, and in fact unavoidable, for the
creditors to have an as risky as possible policy just in order to avoid marginalization. In turn the debtors
are encouraged to borrow larger and larger amounts at lower and lower interest rates.
However, as seen above and in the next sections, the formal expression of the run-away analysis has
many common points with the neo-classical curve-crossing techniques used to find stable equilibria.
In the pre-crisis mode, the system is so successful that it slips into a state of exuberance which feeds back
upon itself and increases exponentially the debt financed investment. [Greenspan 1996], [Schiller 2006]
have called this exuberance ‘irrational’. However this is a matter of point of view: from the individual
profit-seeking (capitalistic, in Minsky’s word) point of view this behavior is rational in as far as it maximizes
one’s personal profits. However, for all-knowing agents who in particular would know the tragedy of the
commons and the contents of the present paper, it should be clear that their behavior is likely to end in
a collective loss.
Some commentators made Greenspan himself and the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) responsible for the
bubble by having kept interest rates too low and thereby encouraging the dangerous exuberance. Indeed,
if loans with low interest (i = interest payments/loan) are available, and the assets that can be bought
with them have a high enough resilience: r = earnings/loan, which exceeds the interest rate: r > i, the
bottom line is that in this regime: earnings > interest payments. Thus borrowing in order to buy those
assets looks from an myopic individual point of view (and in absence of understanding of the emergent
collective dynamics) safe and profitable and thus rational!
This Minsky loans accelerator addresses a perennial puzzle faced by the mainstream neo-classical
economics: the business cycle fluctuations. Not only the neo-classical models predict a crisis-free steady
state but in fact they assume equilibrium as their main conceptual basis. The only way to admit some level
of fluctuations is to attribute it to exogenous shocks that temporarily take the economy out of its stable
equilibrium state [Kydland 1982]. According to those models, following such a shock, the invisible hand
1As discussed below, the finiteness of Ntotal may bring upon the Minsky moment: the Minsky loan accelerator is relying on
the expectations that one may continue indefinitely to make loan-financed investments and pay the interests from the earnings.
The finiteness of the economy means that at some stage the investments would exceed the capacity of the market to buy and
will not give the returns necessary to pay the interest on the loans. This will push some of the most aggressive investors in a
Ponzi position and trigger the Minsky moment.
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(a) Minsky Loan Accelerator for a loan market with fast in-
creasing returns (fat top-bottom arrow, i.e. fast decrease of
the charged i with the supplied loan quantity N). Similarly
to Figure 2(a), the top-down part of the regulatory feedback
loop is related to Eq. 7: a decrease in i leads to an increase
in the demanded quantity of loans, N . The increase in N
leads, according to Eq. 17, to a further decrease in i. If
the decrease in the charged interest rate is so fast that it
exceeds the decrease necessary to increase the demand for
loans (αµ > 1), this has a destabilizing effect on the loans
market and results in a divergent feedback loop.
(b) The Marshall-Walras procedure for the supply and
demand of loans, Eq. 16, in the case of fast increasing
returns, i.e. α > 1/µ. Graphically the iterative process
17 is represented by alternatively drawing vertical ar-
rows to obtain the new it from the previous Nt−1 and
horizontal arrows to obtain the next Nt from the current
it. The process diverges from the unstable fixed point
marked by the intersection (Nfix, ifix) of the curves Eqs.
5, 16. In the limit as t→∞ for an initial loans quantity
N0 < Nfix, the quantity of loans shrinks to Nt → 0.
In contrast, for an initial loan quantity N0 > Nfix, the
quantity of loans increases Nt → ∞ until this ‘bubble’
is stopped by a Minsky moment.
Figure 3: Minsky Loan Accelerator for a loan market with fast increasing returns to scale of the supply of loans
(lower interest rate) and a graphical representation of the coevolution of the parameters i and N . The condition that
determines the difference between the slow and the fast increasing returns is the product αµ of the interscale feedback
parameter α and the heterogeneity coefficient µ, which, in the slow returns markets, is less than and, in the fast returns
market, is greater then 1.
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of the efficient market gently brings the system back to its equilibrium. On the opposite side, Minsky’s
position is that crises are intrinsic to capitalism: the quite visible hand of debt financed investment is
leading the capitalist system out of equilibrium. As seen below, the system eventually brings itself to a
state in which the slightest noise is amplified to a systemic crisis. This ”Minsky moment” is described in
the next subsection.
3.3.2 The Minsky Moment
As shown in the previous subsection, banks that would NOT lend with decreasing interest rates and
debtors that would NOT take increasingly leveraged positions would in fact be the ones to be punished
by lower profits, lower growth rates and market share loss. In order to give more loans, the banks will
have to lend not only to solid highly promising companies (which at some stage become over-leveraged
themselves), but also to units which are only riding on the positive-feedback expectations loop. Moreover,
it is rational that the companies will adopt very large leverage positions that given the current interest
rate are affordable at their current level of earnings. In fact this in itself leads to a version of the Minsky
self-referential feedback loop: as the asset (stock market / real estate market) prices increase, so do
the borrowing capabilities of the units holding them. This provides those units with more collateral for
borrowing more on the same assets (which have now increased market value). The new loans received by
those units may then go back reinvested in stock market / real estate, reinforcing the loop as long as the
market price increases.
In fact, in order for the bank to continue the increase in its volume of lending, it has to find new
borrowers. When all the good borrowers already have a loan, the bank has to lower its lending standards
to capture new borrowers who were previously shut out of the credit market [Adrian 2010]. In an infinite
economy and in the absence of noise this can be shown to be sustainable [LLS 1995]. However in the real
world, one eventually rediscovers the ‘Herbert Stein’s Law’:
“If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” [Krugman 2010].
In the present case the positive feedback loop is broken once there is even a small downward fluctuation of
the rate r of growth of the assets n bought from the loan. This can in particular be brought upon by the
finiteness of Ntotal: the markets expand indefinitely to keep up with the ever increasing (loan financed)
investments. Once the earnings from these investments r × loan cannot cover the interest payments on
their debt i× loan , those units become ponzi and – when discovered – fail. This is the Minsky moment
(Paul McCulley coined the term ‘Minsky moment’ to describe the 1998 Russian financial crisis). Following
the Minsky moment, the previously lax credit policies are tightened, interest rates are increased inew > iold
(Eq. 23 below) which brings even mildly speculative (but until then viable, r > iold) companies into ponzi
positions (r < inew) and eventual failure. In turn, this feeds back onto tightening further credit availability
in the system and closing the feedback loop.
There is always some level of external noise that may cause the system to depart dramatically from
that specified by these equations. As long as the leverage of companies is below a certain threshold, the
noise is not sufficient to induce failures. However, as the leverage increases, the slightest fluctuation in
the interest rate or the earnings may lead some of the borrowers into failure. This is the Minsky moment.
The first wave of failures, induced by the noise, is then amplified systematically by the feedback between
the number of failures and the interest rate; in order to avoid becoming ponzi, companies then have to
deleverage. This increases the interest rate, which in turn forces more companies to deleverage or become
ponzi.
Figure 4 adapts into the present context the analysis of [LLS 1995] of the role of noise and finite size
in triggering the Minsky moment. In the figure it is shown that in the total absence of noise the risk
taking collective behavior may continue to infinity: the interrupted lines, corresponding to 0 noise, show
that the interest rate can continue to decay to arbitrary small values which in turn makes it possible (and
profitable) for borrowers to take increasingly large leverages. By contrast, the slightest noise is bound to
trigger sooner or later a catastrophic Minsky moment. In fact smaller the noise, later is the crisis and
more catastrophic its consequences. Trying to avert the burst of the bubble in those conditions, achieves
only its delay at the price of making it more severe. In the end assessment, it is better to have an economy
with uncontroled noise, rather then one with uncontrolable crashes.
The dynamics following the Minsky Moment can be analysed with methods mathematically identical
with the one used in the previous sections. This will be detailed in the next section. However, it will turn
out that in order to obtain realistic results one has to include the microscopic granularity of the agents
and the network effects of their interactions. This will be the subject of the rest of the paper.
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Figure 4: The Minsky moment adapted from the LLS [LLS 1995] model.
The original LLS model [Levy 1994] [LLS 1995] [LLS 2000] described the burst of a bubble where the fraction, f ,
of investment in the risky assets increased indefinitely approaching 100 % of the individuals’ wealth. This in the
present context corresponds to the sustainable leverage diverging to arbitrary large values of the order L ∼ L0/i (cf.
the interrupted line in Figure 4(b). By sustainable average one means the leverage which is still consistent with the
company not being ponzi. For instance, L0 is the initially sustainable leverage L0 = earnings/(i0 assets).
It was shown in LLS that while in the absence of noise (σ = 0) this regime may continue indefinitely, in the presence
of noise the bubble bursts when L >> 1/σ2 i.e. in our case when i << σ2. In the present paper, the noise appears as
a intrinsic consequence of the granularity of the agent based model.
One may wonder if, in order to avoid the Minsky moment, one should minimize the noise amplitude, σ. The answer
is that reducing σ does indeed allow the system to pursue the exuberance for a longer period and tolerate without
defaults higher leverages L. However, this would only delay the Minsky Moment, not eliminate it. Moreover it would
greatly increase the severity of the crisis once it is triggered. For instance, the presence of a σ = 0.2 noise keeps i
(Figure 4(a)) continuous line) almost two orders of magnitude larger than it would be in its absence σ = 0 (Figure 4
(a) interrupted line). Consequently the jump in the interest rate at the Minsky Moment is, for σ = 0.2, from order
of i ∼ O(1%) to order of i ∼ O(10%) (cf. Figure 4 (a)). Cf. Figure 4 (b) this corresponds to a jump of one order
of magnitude in the sustainable leverage L. In turn this means that all the companies with leverages in between the
old and new sustainable leverage values are suddenly thrown into the ponzi category unless they have enough cash
reserves to deleverage instantly.
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4 A Marshall-Walras-like procedure for the interest rate vs ponzi quantity:
Minsky crisis accelerator
In neoclassical thinking the interest rate, i, is the driving factor toward equilibrium in the debt market:
increasing the interest rate is expected to inhibit risk taking and borrowing when they exceed a certain
limit. One sees that in Minsky’s scenario, beyond a certain ”critical” point increasing the interest rate
has an opposite procyclical effect of triggering the crisis. In the previous section we have considered the
period leading up to the creation of a large amount of unwarranted, unsecured, low interest loans. Of
course, the way to stop the ‘Minsky loans accelerator’ would be to increase the interest rate.
However, this would render a further part of debtors to be ponzi, leading to a ‘Minsky moment’ which
marks the end of the ‘Minsky lending accelerator’ and the start of the ‘Minsky crisis accelerator’: ponzi
failures decrease the credit availability in the system and thus increase the interest rate, i, which in turn
increases the number, Nponzi, of companies n forced into the ponzi status Eq. 3. Below we explain, justify,
formalize and analayse the components of this feeback loop.
This ‘Minsky crisis accelerator’ is believed nowadays to be one of the main mechanisms behind the
propagation of the current economic crisis [Wray 2011b] although its mathematical formulation is under
fierce debate [Keen 1995], [Keen 2012], [Eggertson 2012], [Krugman 2012]. As it will turn out, the anal-
ysis of the Minsky crisis accelerator reduces to a similar mathematical formalism as the Minsky lending
accelerator, except that instead of the quantity of loans, Nloans, it will be the number of ponzi companies,
Nponzi, that closes the feedback loop with the interest rate, i.
Let us define in detail the formal framework. Earlier measurements by [Takayasu 2000] indicate that
both debts and earnings, i.e. the denominator and the numerator in Eq. 3, are distributed according to
power laws. In fact this has been connected with the Pareto wealth distribution power law [Klass 2006].
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the resilience of company n:
r(n) = earnings(n)/debt(n) < i,
also follows a power law distribution with a heterogeneity exponent 1/β:
r(n) = kn1/β (22)
where k and β are empirically fixed parameters.
Inverting Eq. 22 allows us to obtain that the number of ponzi companies for a given interest rate, i,
i.e. the number of companies that have resilience r(n) < i. More precisely, if at a certain time, t, the
interest rate becomes it, this will bring the current number Nt = Nponzi(t) of ponzi companies to:
Nt = (it/k)
β . (23)
On a double logarithmic scale in Figure 5(b) (where N is represented on the x axis, and i on the y axis)
N(i), as defined by Eq. 23, is represented by a straight line of slope 1/β. In this section we assume for
simplicity that a company defaults as soon as it becomes ponzi r(n) < i.2 In the Minsky scenario, these
Nt defaults will cause credit to shrink and consequently the interest rate, it+1, to go up. The following
reasons lead us to expect this effect:
1 Banks will get increasingly worried about lending, because of the increasing danger of companies
failing.
2 The debt left un-served by those companies that failed is now leaving their creditors short of cash.
Consequently the creditors in turn may not be able to pay their own debts.
3 The liquidation of the collaterals used to guarantee the failed companies’ debt will lead to a de-
valuation of the value of similar guarantees held or posted by other companies in the system
[Delli Gatti 2008].
For definiteness we assume that the increase in the interest rate, i, will depend on the current number
of defaults as a power law. More precisely, if the number of ponzis at time t is Nt this will induce an
interest rate:
it+1 = i0N
α
t . (24)
On a double logarithmic scale in Figure 5(b) the function it+1(Nt) is represented by a straight line of
slope α. Thus, as in the illustration of the previous iterative process Eq. 1(b), we have in Figure 5(b) on
the same graph two lines with different roles:
2 In the next sections we will significantly modify this extreme assumption.
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(a) The Minsky top-down bottom-up feedback loop. The
macroscopic state of the system in terms of the credit avail-
ability is parametrized by the interest rate i. The states of
the individual companies are characterized by their ponzi or
non-ponzi status. The top-down part of the Minsky crisis
accelerator feedback loop is related to Eq. 3: an increase
in i will switch the status of some of the companies from
non-ponzi to ponzi. In turn, this increase in the number of
ponzi companies may induce, by the bottom-up part of the
Minsky accelerator loop Eq. 23, a further increase in the
interest rate. For αβ < 1 the process leads to a stable fixed
point.
(b) The graph represents the system of Eqs. 23 and 24.
It allows us to represent graphically the iterative process
26: one starts from the initial number of ponzis (fail-
ures) N0 on the x axis and moves on the vertical full
arrow keeping N = N0 until one intersects the full line
i = i0Nponzi
α. The intersection point defines the new in-
terest rate i1. From the point (N0, i1) one moves on the
horizontal dotted arrow keeping i = i1 till one intersects
the dotted line Nponzi = (i/k)
β . The intersection defines
the new N1. And so on in general: one moves on verti-
cal arrows with fixed Nt to intersect i = i0Nponzi
α and
thus find it+1 and then one moves on horizontal arrows
with fixed it+1 to intersect Nponzi = (i/k)
β and thus find
Nt+1. One sees that the process converges as long as on
the graph the slope of Nponzi(i) is steeper then i(Nponzi)
i.e. when αβ < 1.
Figure 5: The Minsky crisis feedback loop represented by the system of Eqs. 23 and 24. Note that (only) when the
slope of the curve Nponzi(i), which is 1/β, exceeds the slope α of the curve i(Nponzi) (i.e. αβ < 1), does this process
converge. The divergent case (αβ > 1) is illustrated in Figure 6. It is interesting to note that in the αβ < 1 there exists
the possibility that a very large exogenous shock N0 > Nfix can be partially reversed by the system healing itself.
This is explained intuitively by the existence of companies with very large resilience which even after the increase in
the interest rate following the shock, remain viable (not Ponzi). Such companies even when forced momentarily into
failure by the external shock would return to paying their interest as soon as the external shock is absorbed.
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- the line representing Eq. 23 is always and only used to obtain Nt for a given it while
- the line representing Eq. 24 is to be used only to obtain it+1 for a given Nt.
As in the case of Figure 1(b), this is indicated by the arrows in Figure 5(b):
- horizontal arrows will be used to obtain Nt for a given it while
- vertical arrows will be used to obtain it+1 for a given Nt.
The initial conditions for the iterative process are characterized by:
- the state of the system before the shock as expressed by the initial interest rate i0, and
- the strength of the shock as expressed by the number of companies N0 initially knocked down into
failure by it.
Following the Eqs. 23 and 24, and assuming the occurrence of an exogenous shock producing an initial
number of ponzi N0 companies, at a given initial interest rate i0, the unit iteration cycle is:
Nt
Eq.24−−−−→ it+1 Eq.23−−−−→ Nt+1. (25)
One can further represent the entire iterative process, where the given initial shock of N0 ponzi companies
triggers a chain reaction:
N0
Eq.24−−−−→ i1 Eq.23−−−−→ N1 Eq.24−−−−→ i2 · · ·Nt Eq.24−−−−→ it+1 Eq.23−−−−→ Nt+1 · · · (26)
The main questions that such iterative process poses are:
- is the process leading to an increasing sequence of it and Nt (corresponding to a crisis) and if so,
- is the increasing sequence converging to a finite value (limited ‘mini’-crisis) or diverging to a systemic
crisis (Minsky financial accelerator unleashed)?
Thus the parameter ranges of stability vs. crisis are determined by the initial values (i0 and N0) and
especially their position with respect to the fixed points where curves Nponzi(i) and i(Nponzi) intersect.
In the present section (non-network case), there is only one intersection: the common solution of the Eqs.
23 and 24 after imposing stationarity it+1 = it:
Nfix = (i0/k)
β/(1−αβ) (27)
ifix =
(
i0/k
αβ
)1/(1−αβ)
. (28)
As detailed in the Appendix C, the time evolution of the quantity of loans in the process Eqs. 23, 24,
26 shown in Figures 6(a), 5(b) is represented mathematically by:
Nt = Nfix[N0/Nfix]
(αβ)t (29)
This means that in general for αβ < 1 the exponent (αβ)
t → 0 for t→∞ and the fixed point 27, 28
is stable:
- starting with a smaller number of ponzi companies, N0 < Nfix, will lead to a limited crisis that will
stop at (Nfix, ifix).
- starting with a severe economic state where N0 > Nfix the system will heal itself: Nt and it will
iteratively shrink reaching eventually the same stable point (ifix, Nfix). This assumes that as soon
as the interest rate falls sufficiently to make a ponzi company non-ponzi any adverse systemic effects
that its ponzi status had (say, on the interest rate) are erased.
For αβ > 1, (illustrated in Figure 6(b)) and visualized conceptually in Figure 6(a) the situation
reverses: the exponent (αβ)
t →∞ for t→∞ and the fixed point 27, 28 is unstable:
- starting below the fixed point N0 < Nfix will lead to further shrinking in the number of ponzi
companies and in the interest rate.
- if the system is brought (endogenously or exogenously) above the fixed point N0 > Nfix it will enter
in a Minsky financial accelerator and (Nt, it) will further increase until complete economic collapse
or until exogenous measures – e.g. forcing exogenously the interest rate, i, (and / or the failures)
down – stop the process.
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(a) The top-down / bottom-up feedback in the Minsky ac-
celerator. The macroscopic state of the system in terms of
the credit availability, parameterized by the interest rate i.
The states of the individual companies are characterized by
their ponzi or non-ponzi status. The top down part of the
Minsky accelerator feedback loop is related to the Eq. 3:
an increase in i will switch the status of some of the compa-
nies from non-ponzi to ponzi. In turn, this increase in the
number of ponzi companies may induce by the bottom-up
part of the Minsky accelerator loop a further increase in the
interest rate (Eq. 23).
(b) The graph shows the coevolution between the interest
rate (i) and the number of ponzi companies / failures (N)
in the Minsky accelerator. The slope of the red solid line
(α) is steeper than the slope of the blue dashed line (1/β),
which means that in each iteration step the number of
ponzi N and the interest rate i diverge from the fixed
point (graphically represented by the crossing of the blue
and the red lines). Whether N and i will have a positive
increment during their coevolution (which would lead to
a systemic crisis) or a negative one (stable system), it
depends on whether N0 > Nfix or the opposite.
Figure 6: Illustration of the Minsky accelerator loop which assumes that αβ > 1 and as a result of it, the iteration
process 26, graphically represented in Figure 6(b), diverges. For αβ > 1 and the initial number of failures N0 > Nfix
the process leads to a macroscopic chain of failures: the Minsky crisis accelerator.
Note that while passing from the case αβ < 1 to the case αβ > 1 has dramatic consequences for the system, in terms
of the basic model assumptions the differences between the 2 cases are minor: a slight increase in the dependence of
the interest rate on the number of failures or a slight change in the distribution of resiliences within the system can
throw the system from the converging regime αβ < 1 to the Minsky Instability Accelerator regime αβ > 1.
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For instance, central banks in major countries can and have forced down the interest rate (and expanded
inter-bank credit availability) artificially by creating fiat money and lending it at very low interest rate to
banks. That may break (or even reverse) the feedback loop by forcing the red resilience trajectory below
the resilience line of companies and borrowers. The Fed did it immediately while the European Central
Bank (ECB) did it eventually, under the pressure of the markets on the sovereign bonds of Greece, Spain
and Italy.
This section has dealt with the non-network view of the Minsky lending and crisis accelerators. We are
now turning towards casting the basic Minsky ideas into a more realistic agent based network model. The
main new ingredient will be that not all ponzi companies will default or fail. Rather the ponzi condition
will make a company susceptible of being recognized as such and denied credit. The actual switch from
the susceptible to the failed status will depend on the interactions of each ponzi with its trade partners.
More specifically we will assume that a ponzi company will openly fail only when one of the companies
directly connected to it (by a network link) defaults. To prepare this synthesis we first describe in the
next section the propagation of distress by contagion on a network. We will follow therein the formalism
of social and market percolation as described in [Solomon 2000] and [Goldenberg 2000].
5 Propagation of distress by contagion. Crisis Percolation across networks of
companies
5.1 The relevance of contagion and percolation in financial networks
In order to express formally the feedback loops that enforce the propagation of distress between companies
we will use the mathematical concept of percolation in a widened – dynamical – sense, better adapted to
Minsky’s non-equilibrium thought. In its usual sense, the mathematical term of percolation describes the
conditions in which a population of ‘nodes’ connected by binary links is capable of forming macroscopic
connected clusters. However, in the present paper we will use a more dynamical version of this concept,
as has been introduced under the names of social percolation in [Solomon 2000] and market percolation
in [Goldenberg 2000], [Garcia 2011], [Van Eck 2011], [Delre 2010]. In this version, the stress is less on
the question of the static existence of macroscopic clusters, but more on the ‘contagion’ process that
sweeps across the population, creating macroscopic clusters of ‘contaminated’ agents. This allows, in turn,
feedback between the growth of the contaminated cluster and processes that it influences [Solomon 2000]
[Cantono 2010], [Cantono 2012], [Kindler 2013] which can, in their turn, feedback on the growth of the
cluster.
Percolation models are agent based models in which the agents are the nodes of a network and their
interactions are the contagion via the network edges. Contrary to common belief, the computer simulation
of the evolution of the individual states of the agents is neither the only nor the most illuminating way to
extract information about such systems. Quite to the contrary, the formula in Eq. 34, which we deduce
below in a toy setting, and which predicts the size of the contagion avalanche as a function of the density
of susceptible agents, is only the simplest example of a wealth of analytic results that are not only more
precise but also more informative than the direct simulation of the system.
We start by describing the ‘market percolation’ mechanism using the ‘ponzi’ concept introduced in
Section 2.2; this will be relevant for the network extension of the Minsky accelerator.
In the simplest non-network Minsky model, we considered a situation in which any company that
becomes ponzi is immediately identified as such by the economic system and loses its capability to get
further loans. In the absence of credit, such a company becomes incapable of continuing its normal activity
and so, until the conditions change (e.g. new funds or better loan conditions become available), it has to
freeze its activities. The model dynamics consisted then on companies either becoming ponzi (i.e. failing)
or recovering from being ponzi. Once a company is ponzi, its failure was considered immediately known
to the entire system and the consequences of its status were immediately enforced. In this sense the
model adopted the neoclassical assumption that all the agents in the system have perfect and immediate
knowledge of the system state, including the state (failed or not) of all other agents.
However, reality is often different. Consequently, we will consider here a different kind of situation
and its model, in which the exact financial positions of companies is not known to all, especially not to
potential creditors, and a ponzi company would fail openly only if a specific event uncovers (highlights
or brings public attention to) its problems. For instance, it took the distress in much of its environment
to uncover the fact that the Madoff company was ponzi and so to trigger its failure, even though it had
been in the ponzi position for many years previously.
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One may think of many ways by which a ponzi company may openly fail, but definitely its immediate
trade and credit associates are very likely to have an important role in this. For instance, as long as
the company’s banks or suppliers are in very good shape, they will not make problems in financing the
company’s further purchases, operations and investments. Only when the bank notices either that the
company’s clients are themselves in trouble or have failed or that one of its suppliers is not in a position
(due to its own distress) to provide supplies on credit, may the bank start have a closer look at the
company and, noticing its ponzi status, stop its line of credit. Only then will the ponzi company start
failing to meet its obligations and thus its distress will become public knowledge. Reciprocally, only then
will its ponzi status have a negative impact upon its environment (e.g. contributing to the crunch in
the availability of credit, an increase in the interest rate etc.). In particular, other companies, including
banks, in its environment will be more reluctant to lend to one another and may well ask higher interest
when they do.
It thus becomes clear that the mechanisms by which ponzi companies are known openly to have ‘failed’
rather than only potentially in trouble, are contagion-like mechanisms [Solomon 2000], [Weisbuch 2000].
Once this is recognized, the theory of percolation becomes relevant [Stauffer 1985]. In particular, the
contagion rules that were used in [Solomon 2000], [Weisbuch 2000], [Stauffer 1985] can be re-expressed in
the Minsky context as follows:
- A ponzi (‘susceptible’) company that is connected by either business or credit ties only with non-
ponzi (hedge or speculative) partners will be safe against failure.
- On the contrary, a ponzi company that is part of a large connected cluster of ponzi companies (‘ponzi
percolation cluster’ from now on) will be very exposed: once one of the members of the cluster fails
(say by an exogenous shock, or an internal whistle-blower), its ponzi partners will be uncovered too
and then their partners’ partners and so forth. The cascade will eventually reach the entire cluster,
including this company.
Thus, in such a model where recognizing the ‘failed’ status of ponzi companies depends on a mechanism of
contagion by partners, the ponzi percolation clusters are a measure of the size of the crises that individual
events can trigger.
Fortunately, the dependence of the sizes of connected cluster on the density of susceptible (ponzi) nodes
in a network has been studied extensively for the last 40 years by statistical physicists and mathematicians.
In particular, in a very wide range of network geometries there exists a critical density ρC of ponzi
companies, which separates the range where the clusters are all microscopically localized from the range in
which a giant cluster spans across the entire system. Thus, for a low density (fraction of the population)
of ponzis, the ponzi clusters have small sizes and the contagion avalanches will be limited in size. By
increasing the number (and thus the density) of ponzi companies, these clusters gradually become larger
and the gaps between them filled.
Thus, the most relevant property of the percolation model is the existence of a phase transition: as
the density of ponzi companies, ρponzi, comes close to the critical density, ρC , even a minute increase in
ρponzi can lead to dramatic increase in the cluster and thus avalanche size. The smallest noise can cause
the small clusters to fuse into a giant cluster that has the length and width of the size of the entire system.
Figure 7 shows how a noise consisting of making one single company to be ponzi can completely change
the situation and create, from a few small disconnected clusters, a giant cluster that contains most of the
ponzi companies in the system. The main point is that around the critical density, ρC , of ponzi companies
the dynamics is very sensitive to small changes in their density, ρponzi, within the population. This will
have crucial implications for the Minsky accelerator acting on networks of companies.
A process like Minsky’s, rather than affecting locally a small number of ponzis, acquires systemic size
and, consequently, the capability of eliciting significant feedback from the whole system. For instance,
the dynamics introduced in [Solomon 2000], [Weisbuch 2000] can be interpreted as assuming that, after
a large contagion avalanche of failures, the macroeconomic policy may be tuned so as to suppress the
number of ponzis companies which are the ones susceptible to contagion. This lead in [Solomon 2000],
[Weisbuch 2000] to the system self-organizing and self-tuning itself to a state that keeps ρponzi close to the
critical density of ponzi companies, ρC . According to Eq. 34, in this range of ρponzi, the size of the largest
cluster changes between finite to infinite (system size) values, with the consequence that the dynamics is
very sensitive to the smallest change and leads to macroscopic fluctuations. Thus, paradoxically, an effort
to limit instability by reacting to past large crises can sometimes lead, if it is not carried out to the last
implications [Solomon 2000], [Weisbuch 2000], to a regime where large fluctuations become the rule. In
the present paper the source of instability will be different but with similar effects: the reaction of the
system to the failures of ponzi companies will be to reduce the availability of credit generally, in particular
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(a) The evolution of the contagion avalanche in the case where
the noise circle (marked by a bold blue circle surrounding it)
is not ponzi. The circles representing ponzi units are filled
(with yellow). Each cluster of ponzi nodes is marked by a line
sourounding it. In this particular case only the indicated seven
red circles (each marked inside with the time of its contagion)
fail and the rate of contamination is slow: one agent per time
period. At the end of the process not only most of the agents
but also most of the ponzi have not failed.
(b) This time we assume that the ‘noise circle’ (surrounded by
the bold blue circle) is ponzi. Consequently, the ponzi clusters
change significantly: three of them are united in one single
cluster. This time, the evolution of the contagion avalanche
starting from the node marked by 1 leads to a failure avalanche
involving a large fraction of the ponzi. One sees that the rate of
contamination shows large time fluctuations. More specifically,
the time series representing the number of contaminations at
each time step is now 2,3,5,5,1,1,1,0.
Figure 7: Figures 7(a) and 7(b) reveal the emergence of macroscopic fluctuations around the critical point of a
percolation phase transition. The ponzi companies are marked by full circles while the non-ponzi are marked by empty
circles. The ponzi clusters are shown surrounded by frontiers to facilitate their identification as disjoint one from
the other. One assumes that at time 1 the node marked by 1 fails. A failures contagion avalanche is initiated. The
contagion process cannot cross the cluster frontiers. To visualize the time history of the contagion avalanche, inside
the circle representing each contaminated node the time step at which it failed is shown. The small difference between
these figures demonstrates that there can be a large difference between very similar systems. Note that in the case
when the second neighbor (surrounded by an interrupted circle) of the initially failed ponzi (marked by 1) would also
not be ponzi, then the process would stop as soon as it, starts without leaving any significant trace. This figure is an
illustration of the very steep character of the percolation transition.
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by increasing the interest rate. This will increase the density of ponzis and thus the size of the default
avalanches. Thus, instead of the system stabilizing, its reaction to defaults will only keep increasing the
number of ponzi companies and thus the number of failures.
5.2 The Market Percolation transition to Systemic Crisis
The idea of applying percolation to social and market contagion [Solomon 2000], [Goldenberg 2000], in-
troduced in the previous section, has since been exploited in several different contexts (see [Zeppini 2013]
for a review): immunization of communication networks [Goldenberg 2005], advertising and product ac-
ceptance [Yaari 2006], interacting networks (optimism-pessimism influences vs. saving ratios interactions)
[Erez 2005], negative word of mouth [Erez 2004]. Moreover, as in [Weisbuch 2000] and [Vega-Redondo 2007],
one can consider the epidemiological case in which the contaminated, in this case infected, nodes recover
automatically after some time (SIR). It was shown in [Weisbuch 2000] that, in the presence of top-down
reaction, such SIR systems can reach a self-organized critical phase with collective phenomena that lead
in time to macroscopic long range correlations and fractal spatial structures. Again, while the numerical
simulation of such systems is possible and useful, the understanding and ascertaining of the phase tran-
sition and scaling properties of the models is highly dependent on an analytical treatment of the type we
demonstrate below (Eqs. 30–33) in the simplest of settings.
We will start with the simplest model and gradually introduce additional feedback loops and study
their effects. We will then use, in the following section, these iterative contagion feedback loops to explain
the propagation of defaults during an economic crisis following a Minsky moment.
Let’s consider, as the first example, an inter-company network as shown in Figure 7(a), where each node
has exactly K connections and there are no loops. The ponzi units are shown as full circles. The fragility
of the ponzi companies is represented in this simplest model by the fact that they fail by ‘contagion’ as
soon as one of their connections fails. Starting from this rule, one can predict how failures propagate
across the network. More sophisticated hypotheses concerning network geometry may be developed. For
instance, it is likely that in order to destabilize a company, a significant share of its trade has to be
affected rather than just one of the partners being in default. A model that captures this has been studied
theoretically in [Kindler 2013]. For the sake of clarity, we discuss here the simplest model.
Assume that at time 1 one starts with just one node, marked by 1 in Figure 7(a), failing. This could
happen exogenously or by contamination from its neighbor (from ‘above’ as shown in Figure 7(a)). This
brings the number of new failed companies at time t = 1 to N(1) = 1. How many failures will follow as
a consequence of this trigger? An illustration of the process is given in Figure 7(a). The ponzis which
fail are marked by the time step of their failure. After eight time steps, eight companies failed. Note that
not all the ponzi companies fail by the end of the process, only the ones belonging to the same cluster in
which the trigger occurred. Also note that in the Figure 7(a) the rate of contagion is one ponzi per time
step.
Statistically, if the density of ponzi companies is ρponzi, and out of the K neighbors of the first failed
node, one neighbor has already failed, then the expected number of new failed companies in the next time
step t = 2 will be:
N(2) = (K − 1)ρponzi (30)
In the next time step, each of these (K−1)ρponzi companies will contaminate another (K−1)ρponzi number
of companies. Extending this iterative process to t time steps, the total number of failed companies by
time t becomes Nfailed = N(1) +N(2) + · · ·+N(t), which is the series:
Nfailed(t) = 1 + (K − 1)ρponzi + [(K − 1)ρponzi]2 + · · ·+ [(K − 1)ρponzi](t−1). (31)
The number of failed companies after t time steps is, therefore, obtained by summing Eq. 31:
Nfailed(t) = ([(K − 1)ρponzi]t − 1)/([(K − 1)ρponzi]− 1). (32)
To understand the ‘failure avalanche’, or domino process, that the iterative contagion of neighbors
implies, let us consider first the special case where (K − 1)ρponzi = 1. Then, each term in Eq. 31 equals 1
and at each time step there is one more ponzi that fails. This means that the number of failed companies
grows linearly in time. This is a limiting case represented by the red straight line in Figure 8.
If (K − 1)ρponzi > 1, then the number of failed companies will grow exponentially to infinity (blue
(diamonds) line in Figure 8). If however (K − 1)ρponzi < 1, then the process saturates (grey (triangles)
line in Figure 8) and the amount in Eq. 32 is a sum of a convergent series even for time t→∞:
Nfailed(t =∞) = [1− (K − 1)ρponzi]−1 (33)
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Figure 8: The number of failed ponzi units as a function of time according to Eq. 32. The red (squares) line is for
(K − 1)ρponzi = 1, the blue (diamonds) line for (K − 1)ρponzi > 1 and the grey (triangles) line for (K − 1)ρponzi < 1.
This is plotted for a few values of ρponzi in Figure 8 and its economic implications are discussed below.
This happens in the simple geometry of our network, where only one neighbor that fails leads to the failure
of all its susceptible connected peers.
More generally speaking, when the network is more realistic, the critical value of the ponzi companies
density is not ρC = (K − 1)−1 as in Eq. 33, but another value which depends on the geometry of the
network. Moreover the divergence ‘critical exponent’ in Eq. 33 is, in general, not one but another value, γ,
that depends on the network. The generic formula for a very large class of networks (including all regular
lattices, random Erdos-Renyi networks with any average number of neighbors, small-world networks etc.)
which have finite average number of neighbors per node, ρponzi close to ρC , is:
Nfailed = S
[
1− ρponzi
ρC
]−γ
. (34)
S is a constant close to 1 depending on the details of the geometry and of the initial conditions. When the
density of ponzi companies, ρponzi, reaches the critical density, ρC , this formula implies that the number
of failed companies jumps from a finite to an ‘infinite’ value. This, in physics, is called a (percolation)
phase transition: from the regime where the contagion causes only ‘microscopic’ localized disruptions
involving small clusters, the system switches to a regime where the contagion affects clusters of the size
of the system itself. This result, however, holds only in the infinite system limit when the total number
of agents Ntotal is assumed infinite. Of course for a finite system, the number of failed companies cannot
be larger then the number of ponzies:
Nfailed ≤ Nponzi = ρponziNtotal. (35)
In particular, at the critical density, ρC , the number of failures cannot exceed the critical number of
ponzis:
Nfailed(ρC) ≤ NC = ρCNtotal. (36)
In general, the number of failed companies, Nfailed, is bounded from above by the value:
Nfailed < ρponziNtotal. (37)
In fact this upper bound becomes a good approximation once the largest cluster is large enough to be
neighbor to most of the nodes that it doesn’t contain. Given its fractal properties this happens very soon
after ρponzi exceeds ρC and we will use this approximation in the next section:
Nfailed = min
{
S[1− ρponzi/ρC ]−γ , ρponziNtotal
}
(38)
The analytic evaluation of the number of contaminated nodes as a function of the ponzi density is not
the only percolation theoretical result that one can extract about contagion propagation among agents
interacting through a network of connections. The details of the process by which the clusters coalesce as
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the density of ponzi increases can provide a vast amount of additional information about systemic crises.
In particular it determines the fractal geometrical properties of the clusters and impinges on the dynamics
of the system in crucial ways. The intermittent fluctuations of the propagation process, both in time and
among different realizations of the process, have been studied in detail theoretically and by Monte Carlo
simulation [Solomon 2000, Goldenberg 2000, Hohnisch 2007]. Their implications for real market systems
have been discussed in [Cantono 2010] (Figures 3–4 and 7–8).
In fact the formula 38 characterising the size of the susceptible clusters, Figure 7(a), can be interpreted
in its wider implications: it characterizes the size of the expected fluctuations of the system in space and
time, as well as between samples, as a function of the proximity of the density to the transition point ρC
[Herrmann 1992], [Derrida 1994], [Parisi 2004]. Thus, the size of the percolation clusters are a measure,
not only of the extent of network regions affected by the contagion avalanches, but also of their space,
time and inter-sample variability.
In the rest of the paper we will repeatedly use the fact that around the critical state ρ ∼ ρC the system
displays extreme fluctuations which are manifested in:
- the fractal spatial distribution of the failed units,
- the intermittent time series of the number of contagions,
- the non-self averaging variability between different stochastic realizations of the same system.
These characteristics will provide tools for diagnostic, prediction and steering of the Minsky crisis propa-
gation process in real systems.
Transcending the average formula 38 and studying the details of the percolation model at the agent
level is of great theoretical and practical importance; it gives the means to evaluate properties that until
now were outside the grasp of a quantitative or even conceptual treatment:
- what are the departures of the individual empirical realizations from the statistical average, Eq. 38?
- what are the time delays between the moment that the first individual agent in the giant cluster is
contaminated and until the entire cluster fails?
- are there moments in the propagation process where a local intervention can stop, delay or accelerate
the propagation of distress?
- what is the role of individual agents and events in determining the macroscopic fate of the system?
- can one identify those individual agents and events and prescribe an appropriate action for them?
Solomon and [Weisbuch 2000], [Hohnisch 2005], [Cantono 2010] have provided examples of how to answer
such questions in a few specific and generic market contexts. The present paper opens the way for applying
those techniques also to the crisis percolation transition.
5.3 Diversification increases Fragility
The analytic formula 38 is an example of how an agent model can be treated theoretically. While it is
common throughout much of the literature to consider agents models as identical with computer simula-
tions, we see here an example in which a large set of connected agents (nodes) have collective properties
that can be evaluated analytically. Moreover, the analytical formulae allow one to identify transitions
between qualitatively different parameter ranges.
In the present case the Eq. 34 clearly indicates the transition, at ρponzi = ρC , between the range in
which the susceptible clusters (and consequently the contagion avalanches) are localized in limited regions
of the network and the parameter range in which they extend arbitrarily far across the system. Thus,
following our assumption that a ponzi company will fail if one of its neighbours fails, one can obtain the
result that a number of companies (which could be a significant fraction of the entire system) will fail.
Note that not necessarily all the companies will fail: while some companies become ponzi because of the
financial system dynamics, some companies among the most resilient may remain non-ponzi. Furthermore,
even among the ponzi, not all of them will be reached by the failure avalanche (e.g. as in Figure 7(b)).
Looking at Eq. 33 from another point of view, not through the dependence on ρponzi, but through the
dependence on K, one sees that the number of failed companies increases with K. So, this simple model
predicts that a highly connected network (high diversification of trade debt partners) will increase the
probability of systemic failure by favoring contagion avalanches and thus facilitating the crisis percolation
phase transition. This is, of course, at variance with the mainstream economics main theme that diversi-
fication is always good [Sharpe 1964]. According to the very simple model above, diversification of itself
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Figure 9: Increase in the number of failed companies with an increase in the average degree, K, of neighbors in the
network, for different densities of ponzi companies, ρponzi, susceptible to default.
is neither good nor bad; whether it is or is not depends on the state of the economy and the company’s
own financial fragility. During a boom, having large K will amplify these positive trends. However, in
the situation when the density of ponzi, ρponzi, is large, a large K in combination with the large number
of ponzi companies will imply the possibility that the failure chain reaction might sweep the system from
one end to another. In order to discriminate between those situations where diversification is a source of
instability from those where it is a stabilizing feature, one has to perform empirical measurements rather
than using mere models.
From the theoretical viewpoint, one can only argue that the diversification, K, may have opposite
effects on the individual and collective economic stability [Battiston 2012], [Caccioli 2012]. Such a desta-
bilizing effect of diversification and risk-sharing among financial actors has been discussed in the context
of securitization [Adrian 2008], [Stein 2011]. The processes of pooling and securitization have increased
leverage which led to the present crisis. Lenders who would not have considered lending using a single
subprime mortgage as collateral, when acting as a buyer of the pool of mortgages, actually borrow 70
percent of those pools’ collective value [Geneakoplos 2010], and securitization took this borrowing on pools
one step further by converting the loans into long-term loans. Losses by leveraged buyers of assets can
cause a chain reaction when a leveraged buyer is forced to sell, which might lower the price of the assets
and force another leveraged buyer to sell and so on. Concerning credit expansion, Adair Turner, Chairman
of UK’s Financial Services Authority asked in a fall of 2011 speech:
“how far [can we] rely on traditional policy levers to ensure that either the aggregate amount
of credit created or its sectoral allocation is socially optimal? The answer I will give is not
much. . . . We need to challenge the idea that financial innovation is axiomatically beneficial
in a social as well as private opportunity sense.” Adair Turner, Credit Creation and Social
Optimality, speech at Southampton University, 29.09.11. 3.
6 Minsky accelerator on financial / trade network
6.1 Definition of the Minsky accelerator percolation model
The simple Minsky accelerator idea of Section 4 will in this section be combined with the simple market
and social percolation idea as applied to economic and financial systems in Section 5.
Already in [Solomon 2000] the idea of making the susceptibility of individual nodes dependent on the
current extent of the contagion was used to obtain the self-organization of a system in a critical state.
However the difference is that in the original social percolation paper the top-down feedback was negative,
or translated in the terminology of the present article: the next interest rate it+1 was a decreasing function
of the current number of contaminated nodes Nt i.e.:
i (Nfail(t)) < i (Nfail(t− 1)) iff Nfail(t) > Nfail(t− 1) (39)
3http://www.mondovisione.com/_assets/files/Credit-Creation-Social-Optimality-Southampton-Uni-20110929.pdf
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This lead to a self-regulating feedback loop. Using the terminology from the Minsky accelerator
model, the self-regulating feedback loop consists of the following sequence of steps:
- suppose some exogenous event or a endogenous fluctuation increases the interest rate from it−1
to it > it−1;
- this transforms into ponzi all the nodes n with resiliences in the range it > r(n) > it−1;
- thus the number of ponzi increases from Nponzi(t− 1) to Nponzi(t) > Nponzi(t− 1);
- those of the new ponzi that have failed neighbors get contaminated and fail too thereby increasing
the number of failures from Nfail(t− 1) to Nfail(t) > Nfail(t− 1),
- but according to the assumption of model Eq. 39 this implies i(Nfail(t)) < i(Nfail(t− 1)) i.e. the
original increase in the interest rate it > it−1 causes a decrease in the interest rate:
it+1 < it closing the self-regulating loop.
This negative feedback loop caused the network system in [Solomon 2000] to self-organize in the critical
state: Nponzi(t) ∼ NC . To see this assume that:
- due to some fluctuation or perturbation the number of ponzi Nponzi decreases from a value above the
percolation threshold Nponzi(t− 1) > NC to a number below the percolation thershold Nponzi(t) <
NC .
- Then, according Eq. 34, the number of failures will decrease dramatically from a giant cluster of the
size of the system (Eq. 37) to a localized small cluster: Nfail(t) << Nfail(t− 1).
- According to Eq. 39 this will cause the interest rate to increase i(Nfail(t)) > i(Nfail(t− 1)),
- which would increase the number of ponzi nodes according Eq. 23.
- Thus, in [Solomon 2000] as long as the ponzi density was below the percolation threshold the number
of ponzi nodes increased and vice versa: as long as the ponzi density was above the percolation
threshold the number of ponzi nodes decreased.
- Therefore the regulatory loop kept the system fluctuating around the critical point Nponzi(t) ∼ NC .
In the present paper rather then the self-regulating feedback Eq. 39, we have a positive feedback
loop [Hohnisch 2007, Cantono 2010, Cantono 2012] between the number of failures / defaults and the
interest rate, according to Eqs. 23 and 24. Thus, the effect will not be self-organized convergence to the
critical point Nponzi(t) ∼ NC but rather the possibility for instability: the Minsky instability.
In the present section we will study in detail the conditions in which this destabilizing scenario can
take place.
Suppose that due to some internal fluctuation or some external perturbation one or more clusters of
companies fail. This will have two effects corresponding respectively to the phenomena introduced in
Section 4 and in Section 5:
- the interest rate will increase cf. Eq. 24:
i = i0(Nfail)
α (40)
and consequently all the nodes n with resilience less then the new interest rate:
r(n) < i
will become ponzi. According to Eq. 23 their number will be
Nponzi = (i/k)
β . (41)
- Among those ponzi companies, cf. Section 5, only those ponzi nodes which are connected to the
failed cluster(s) will become contaminated and fail too. According to Eq. 34 their number will be:
Nfail = min
{
S[1− ρponzi/ρC ]−γ , ρponziNtotal
}
. (42)
The conceptual structure of this top-down (Eq. 41) → peer-to-peer (Eq. 42) → bottom-up
(Eq. 40) Minsky crisis accelerator is visualized in Figure 10.
We use Eqs. 35, 36 to express ρponzi/ρC as Nponzi/NC and to rewrite Eq. 42 as
Nfail = min
{
S[1−Nponzi/NC ]−γ , Nponzi
}
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Figure 10: The more complicated but more realistic case (defined in 6.1) where not all the ponzi companies fail,
but only those ones that have a partner that failed them. Because of this, the feedback loop acquires an additional
link: the peer-to-peer interaction through which the failure of a trade partner causes a ponzi company to actually fail
and be recognized as such by the other peers and by the entire system. Only at that stage, when its status switches
from ponzi (’susceptible to failure’) to ’failed’, does the ponzi company contribute to the increase in the interest rate
through the bottom-up interaction Eq. 23.
This allows us to eliminate Nponzi using Eq. 41 and reduce the system of Eqs. 40, 41 and 42 to a format
similar to the one used in the previous sections of two equations iterating only the time evolution of Nfail
and i:
Nt = min
{
S[1− (it/iC)β ]−γ , (it/k)β
}
(43)
and Eq. 24:
it+1 = i0N
α
t (44)
where iC is defined by NC = (iC/k)
β . We also assume here αβ < 1. The discussion of the less empirically
relevant case αβ > 1 is in the Appendix D.
Eqs. 43 and 44 close a new autocatalytic positive feedback loop similar to Eqs. 23 and 24 and leading
to a iterative process similar to 9 and 17 :
N0
Eq.44−−−−→ i1 Eq.43−−−−→ N1 Eq.44−−−−→ i2 · · ·Nt Eq.44−−−−→ it+1 Eq.43−−−−→ Nt+1 · · · (45)
This is represented by Figure 11, similarly to Figures 5(b) and 6(b) except that this time the line Eq.
43 is not straight, not even on a double logarithmic scale. This opens the way to the possibility of having
more then one fixed point and to more dynamical phases (regimes) as detailed in the next sub-section.
6.2 Analysis of the dynamics of the Minsky accelerator percolation model
As detailed in the Appendix D and represented in Figure 11, there are 3 possible fixed points corre-
sponding to common solutions of 43 and 44:
- two fixed points Nconv and Ndiv due to the possible intersections of the curve N = S[1−(i/iC)β ]−γ
with i = i0N
α. The names of the points imply that one of those two points is convergent and the
other divergent.
- one fixed point Ncore identical with the fixed point that we obtained in the previous sections as
the common solutions of N = (i/k)β and i = i0N
α. This point is convergent under the assumption
that αβ < 1.
The fixed points Nconv, Ndiv and Ncore are convergent (stable, attactive) or divergent (unstable,
repulsive) according to the criterion Eq. 21. Stability can also be graphically determined by following the
arrows in Figure 11 in the same way as described in Figure 5(b). The exact formulae for Nconv, Ndiv, Ncore
are deduced and listed in the Appendix D. These 3 fixed points divide the range of the possible initial
number of failures N0 into four regions /phases which we characterize below:
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Figure 11:
There are three possible fixed points resulting from the intersections of the curves N(i) Eq. 43 and i(N) Eq. 44:
Nconv, Ndiv, Ncore. The fixed points separate 4 phases characterized by different prospects of the iterative process 45:
− N0 < Nconv: direction of the arrows shows an increase of failed companies. After a limited crisis, the
iterative process converges to the point Ncore.
− Nconv < N0 < Ndiv: the initial number of failed companies decreases during the iterative process, attracted
by the convergent point Nconv, which means that the initial crisis heals up.
− Ndiv < N0 < Ncore: the arrows show that the number of failed companies grows towards the Ncore
convergent point. This phase is very dangerous as it implies that the contaminated cluster grows beyond the percolation
transition critical point until it reaches the non-network finite size effects.
− N0 > Ncore: in this range, the initial crisis is large, but the number of failed companies decreases with the
iterative process towards the convergent point Ncore.
N0 < Nconv
If the process 45 starts with an initial shock characterized by a number of defaults N0 < Nconv
then Nt initially increases with t but eventually converges to Nconv. We say we have a limited crisis
which consumes itself at the microscopic level by failing a limited number of ponzi companies in the
neighborhood of the initial shock.
Nconv < N0 < Ndiv
This region is still in the attraction range of the fixed point Nconv so a crisis starting with a shock
in this range will not propagate at all and it might eventually heal itself by converging to Nconv and
its corresponding low interest rate.
Ndiv < N0 < Ncore
In this region the contaminated cluster grows beyond the percolation transition critical point until
it reaches the non-network finite size effects described in Section 4 and stops at Ncore.
Ncore < N0
This case is characterized by a catastrophic number of initially failed companies. Following such a
catastrophe, a limited core of very solid companies will recover endogenously. The rest will remain
in the failed state but no additional failures are expected. Thus the process will converge to Ncore.
While Figure 11 depicts the behavior of the system for a given initial interest rate i0, chosen such that
all three fixed points Nconv, Ndiv, Ncore (and the phases that they separate) exist, Figure 12(a) contains
the fixed points configurations for the entire range of values of i0. So the Figure 11, which miniature
version is added to Figure 12 as subfigure(c), corresponds to just one horizontal section i0fig11 in Figure
12(a). In exchange for this more comprehensive display of the information (joint dependence on N0 and
i0 of the process outcome) Figure 12(a) misses the time evolution of the system as displayed in Figure 11
and Figures 12 b,c,d,e.
The connection between theses complementary views is better understood if one notices that in Figure
11, which is on the logarithmic scale, the variation of i0 corresponds simply to rising or lowering of the
red line i = i0N
α while maintaining its slope α unchanged. Varying i0, it may occur that some of the
three possible fixed points will not exist. Indeed, this is what subfigures 12(b)-(e) represent. Similarly to
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Figure 12: In Figure 12(a), the horizontal axis represents the initial number of failed companies N0, while the vertical
axis represents the initial interest rate i0. On the right side of the phase diagram 12(a) are the auxiliary graphs
describing the various dynamics of the iterative process Eq. 45, similar to Figure 11 (which itself is represented as
subfigure (c)). Each of these graphs correspond to a particular i0 value and are placed with respect to the map 12(a)
such that they are roughly at a hight equal to the y axis value i0 to which they correspond.
Note that while each of the Subfigures 12(b)-(e) displays explicitly through the arrows the evolution in time of the
system for a fixed i0 value and given N0 initial values, by contrast, the Figure 12(a) is a static map summarizing
the final state of the system corresponding to the entire range of initial conditions (i0, N0). Thus, even though it is
tempting, it is not correct to imagine the time evolution of the system as a trajectory in the (i0, N0) 12(a) map since
of course the initial conditions i0, N0 do not vary during the process. However, one can follow the evolution of Nt and
it on the x and y axes of 12(b)-(e) for given i0 and N0 initial conditions.
The phase where the system is stable is square patterned, the Micro Crisis phase is colored uniform in lilac; the phase
of Minsky instability is marked with strips, the solid core phase is left blank.
In the subfigures (b)-(e), which are on the logarithmic scale, the variation of i0 is represented simply by rising or
lowering the red line i = i0N
α while maintaining its slope α unchanged. Accordingly, by varying i0 one can have 3
cases:
(c) i0C < i0 < isafe
all 3 intersections Nconv, Ndiv, Ncore exist. An instance is shown in subfigure 12(a) as the orange horizontal line
i0 Fig 10 and the three small filled circles, corresponding to the three fixed points Nconv, Ndiv, Ncore in Figure 11.
Depending on the strength of the initial shock N0 the process may belong to one of the 4 phases: Micro-Crisis
(uniform lilac color) for N0 < Nconv, Stable (square pattern) for Nconv < N0 < Ndiv, Minsky instability (strips) for
Ndiv < N0 < Ncore, solid core (blank) N0 > Ncore.
(b) i0 > i0C
the line i = i0N
α is raised above N = S
[
1− (i/iC)β
]−γ
and consequently the intersections Nconv and Ndiv do not
exist. As a result, the iterative process Eq. 45 always reaches the fixed point Ncore for all initial shocks N0. This
corresponds the region of the diagram Figure 12(a) above the horizontal line i0C and to the subfigure 12(b). It contains
most of the Minsky instability phase. In this range, the effect of the network is to delay the crisis but it does not affect
the ultimate outcome: all of the companies outside the very solid core fail.
(e) i0 < isafe
the line i = i0N
α is lowered below the junction of N = S
[
1− (i/iC)β
]−γ
with N = (it/k)
β and consequently the
fixed points Ncore and Ndiv do not exist. As a result the iterative process Nt Eq. 45 always converges to Nconv for all
initial shocks N0. This corresponds to subfigure 12(e) and the part of the phase diagram 12(a) below the horizontal
line isafe, where the stable economy phase is contiguous with the solid core phase. The network effects are protecting
almost completely the range of parameters left in danger by the non-network case and the only danger are local limited
Micro-Crises (lilac region to the left of Nconv).
(d) i0 = isafe
describes the situation in which Ncore and Ndiv meet and form the point Nsafe.
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the subfigure (c) which illustrate the horizontal section i0fig11, subfigures (b), (d), (e) have been added
to illustrate the horizontal cross sections in the other relevant areas of the phase diagram (a). In fact,
the Figures 12(b)-(e) are placed with respect to 12(a) such that their vertical position corresponds to the
height on the y axis in 12(a) that marks the value of i0 for which they are plotted.
The intervals between fixed points in Figure 11 correspond to entire areas in the phase diagram 12(a)
and each of the fixed points of Figure 11, marked by little circles on ı0fig11 is part of the boundaries
separating the phases in 12(a). We use in Figure 12(a) different patterns to mark the four phases that the
iterative process may belong to, depending on the strength of the initial shock N0 and the initial state of
the economy i0:
– Micro-Crisis for N0 < Nconv, uniform dark lilac color;
– Stable for Nconv < N0 < Ndiv, square pattern;
– Minsky instability for Ndiv < N0 < Ncore, striped pattern;
– Solid core for N0 > Ncore, blank area.
The structure of Figure 12(a) is determined by the way in which the initial value i0 affects the existence
and position of the the 3 fixed points Nconv, Ndiv, Ncore. Thus according to the computations in the
Appendix D we distinguish three main cases according to the position and intersections of the line i = i0N
α
with respect to the line N = min{S [1− (i/iC)β]−γ , (it/k)β}:
i0 > i0C subfigure 12(b)
In this case the line i = i0N
α is positioned above the S
[
1− (i/iC)β
]−γ
curve and their intersections
Nconv, Ndiv do not exist nor does the ”stable phase”. In the absence of the fixed points Nconv
and Ndiv, the failures contagion process (Eq. 45) continues unhindered beyond the percolation
threshold. This is the meaning of the part of the Minsky instability (which is indicated by
striped pattern) phase which, as seen in the diagram 12(a), extends from S to the only left fixed
point: Ncore = (i0/k)
β/(1−αβ) The Ncore convergent fixed point insures the survival of only the most
resilient companies and defines the “very solid core” (blank area) phase in the diagram 12(a).
The “very solid core” depends on the initial state of the system before the shock i0 and on the
shape on the resiliences distribution. In particular it contains those companies that have such a
large resilience that exceeds even the values of i corresponding to all the other companies in the
economy having failed. Of course, not all the companies that were ”hedge” for i = i0 belong to the
”very solid core”. This is a crucial point of the Minsky instability idea: many companies that look
safe before the Minsky moment, are likely to fail in the crisis following it.
isafe ≤ i0 ≤ i0C subfigure 12(c)
This range corresponds to Figure 11 and the horizontal line i0fig11 from Figure 12(a). All three
fixed points Nconv < Ndiv < Ncore exist and so do the four phases above.
For i0 = isafe, subfigure 12 (d), the fixed points Ncore and Ndiv coincide (cf. Appendix D) and the
”Minsky instability phase” shrinks to one point.
For i0 = i0C the two solutions Nconv and Ndiv coincide and the stable phase shrinks to one point.
i0 < isafe subfigure 12(e)
In this case the line i = i0N
α is below the meeting point of N = S[1 − (i/iC)β ]−γ and (it/k)β
and thus does not intersect N = min{S[1 − (i/iC)β ]−γ , (i/k)β}. Consequently Nconv, Ndiv do not
exist nor does the ’Minsky instability phase’. In the absence of Ndiv and Ncore the only fixed point
remains Nconv and the process Eq. 45 converges to it.
This ends up the analytic quantitative description of the phase diagram of the percolation Minsky
model. We turn now to the discussion of the empirical meaning and policy implications of the model.
7 Towards a microscopic view of economic monitoring, regulation and inter-
vention
7.1 Using the Phase Diagram as a regulatory tool
The phase diagram presented in Figure 12(a) was formulated in terms of the initial shock to the number
of ponzi companies, N0, their resilience (parametrized by k and β) and the initial interest rate, i0. In
discussing the empirical applications, it might be easier to use the phase diagram Figure 13, where the
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system dynamics is expressed in terms also of the initial failures shock, N0, but of the initial ponzi
density, ρ0, rather than i0. The relation connecting ρ0 to i0 is (i0/k)
β = ρ0Ntotal; see Eq. 111 in
Appendix D. One of the advantages that makes Figure 13 more natural is that in all the formulae therein,
the exponent α, characterizing the inter-scale feedback Eq. 24, and the coefficient β, characterizing
the companies heterogeneous resilience Eq. 23, appear in the combination αβ showing that agents’
resilience heterogeneity, bottom-up feedback (and network geometry) are combined together by the Minsky
accelerator scenario. In fact, the parameters tend to appear in the combination αβγ which lumps together
the geometrical properties of the economic network, the structure of the agents heterogeneity and the
interscale feedback. This is likely to ease the empirical calibration of the model by reducing the effective
number of free parameters.
As seen in the log-log phase diagram Figure 13, and the previous Section, the effect of the network is
that the borders between the different phases become non-linear.
Moreover, as opposed to the non-network case where the fixed point was attractive (for αβ < 1), in
the network case one has also unstable fixed points. These points generate a frontier between the phases
that can be very abrupt. For instance, the percolation transition at Section 5, which was continuous in
the absence of the Minsky accelerator, becomes discontinuous. At N0 = Ndiv the slightest increase in the
density of ponzi to N0 > Ndiv can throw the system into a process of accelerated crisis, while for a slight
decrease to an N0 < Ndiv the system is self-healing.
A crucial network effect is the shift of the crisis contagion range from quite low values of ρ0 to a relative
large ponzi density threshold ρsafe. This is because in a network with critical percolation transition density
ρC , for ρt < ρC the ponzi units are isolated in localized mutually disconnected clusters. Thus the failure
contagion chains are quite short and one has a rather extended stable range of parameters. In the absence
of network effects, the entire square patterned stable area at the left of the N = (ρ0Ntotal)
1/(1−αβ) line
would be unstable, with N increasing to Ncore.
In the range ρsafe < ρ0 < ρ0C , the same network effect is partially holding, and a systemic crisis can
take place only following a shock strong enough to produce spontaneously a cluster of size N0 > Ndiv
failures. Then the number of ponzi failures will increase but only to Ncore.
Even for ρ0 > ρ0C , the network has significant effect in the planning and implementation of the policy
interventions: it delays the advancement of the crisis in the stage Nt ∼ N0C when the flow of failures is
very weak and can be cut completely by targeting for support a very small and specific set of nodes. For
instance in order to stop the crisis propagation in Figure 14(a) it is enough to intervene and prevent the
failures of the points marked by 5 in Figure 14(b). These are the nodes belonging to the bottleneck that
connects the already contaminated cluster to new clusters: if this bottleneck is identified and severed,
the crisis propagation is stopped. Alternatively, one may lower the interest rate temporarily to stop their
contagion.
7.1.1 Further elaboration of the dynamics of N in the vicinity of the critical points (N0C , ρ0C) and
(NC , ρC).
It is important to note that in addition to the three ρ0 regimes above, in the ranges around their borders,
the process 45 may show features that are very sensitive to the agent based nature of system.
There are two parameter ranges that are particularly sensitive to it:
1. a) For ρ0 = ρ0C , where the two solutionsNconv = Ndiv = N0C coincide and the stable phase shrinks
to one point, the ‘decision’ of the system whether to stop the propagation of failures locally at
N0C or to continue to the macroscopic Ncore depends on microscopic details. Sometimes the
fate of the process depends on one or two agents that have their resilience above or below the
value of the current ρt when the Nt approaches N0C . Such situation is illustrated in Figures
14(a) and 14(b). For this parameter range, obviously the different realizations of the dynamics,
even with identical macroscopic parameters, may have very different outcomes: microcrisis vs
systemic crisis. In order to provide a precise prediction one needs to know the details of the
resiliences and connections of the agents failing around Nt = N0C .
b) Moreover, even if ρ0 > ρ0C there is a pronounced slowing down [Hohnisch 2007, Cantono 2010]
in the advance of Nt as one passes the ‘bottleneck’ range around N0C . This is also seen in the
subfigure 12(b) where it takes many iterations for the process to advance through the region
where the two curves N(i) and i(N) are very close one to the another, see Figure 14(c). If the
advancement of the process Nt+1−Nt is of the order of a few units, the agent granular structure
of the system becomes macroscopically evident and the continuous approach is informative
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Figure 13: The figure illustrates the crucial effect of a network in limiting the spread of a crises.
For ρ0 > ρ0C the effect of the network is to delay the crisis but it does not affect the ultimate outcome (unless the delay
is used by the policy makers to intervene, e.g. by lowering the interest rate or supporting key susceptible companies).
For ρ0 < ρsafe the network effects are protecting almost completely the range of parameters left in danger by the
non-network case and the only danger are local limited Micro-Crises.
In the case in which there are no network obstructions, the entire region at the left of the line ‘Non-network Stability
frontier’ would be unstable and any process starting with ρ0, N0 in that range would cause a positive feedback loop
that would leave a large number of companies to default. In fact only the very resilient companies in the solid core
would survive.
It is tempting to interpret the Figure 13 as a map of the evolution of the crisis in the (i,N) plane. Unfortunately this
is not exact. All this figure gives is the outcome of the process for given initial values (i0, N0). For details of the
process one has to refer to Figure 11.
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(a) A crisis triggered by the failure of the node labeled by 1.
The numbers on yellow ponzi nodes correspond to their time
of failure. The bottleneck at the time step 5 slows down the
propagation of failures. In fact eliminating the 2 nodes that
get contaminated at time step 5, the network splits in 3 small
clusters and the crisis is stopped and confined to only one of
them.
(b) The plot of the number of new failures at
each time corresponding to the process in Fig-
ure 14(a). One sees that there is a bottleneck
at time 5. This means that one can stop the
crisis if one immunizes the 2 nodes marked by
5 in Figure 14(a). Guaranteeing their debts to
the 2 points labeld 6 would also suffice in stop-
ping the crisis.
(c) Rate of failures corresponding to the graph 12(b)
when the initial ponzi density is above the bottleneck
around ρ0C . One observes a long crisis slow-down pe-
riod.
Figure 14: The failure dynamics in the critical region. The giant cluster in Figure 14(a) depends one rather weak
bridges between the sub-clusters. This leads to the existence of bottlenecks in the propagation rate, to large fluctuations
in the contagion rate and to opportunities of cheply stopping the crisis. Figure 14(c) corresponds to the region in
Figure 12 where the initial number of failures is in the vicinity of the critical point (N0C , ρ0C).
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only on average and the predictive power can be restored only by detailed knowledge of the
connections and resiliences of the agents involved at this phase of the process.
2. As ρt increases towards ρC , the growth of the contaminated cluster is not based on the addition
to it of individual agents. Rather, the mechanism of cluster growth is by cluster coalescence: a
ponzi cluster that is already contaminated is connected by a new ponzi agent (may be generated
by a recent increase in ρt) to an until then uncontaminated ponzi cluster. An example is in Figure
14(a) where the points marked by 5 connect between the 3 subclusters composing the giant cluster.
This generates small avalanches which stop or slow down when the ponzi (sub-)cluster is entirely
contaminated. Thus the propagation is dominated by the successive failure of clusters or cluster of
clusters. In Figure 14(b) one sees the slowing down around time 5. This clusters structure leads
both to a fractal rate and a fractal geometry of failures. In statistical mechanics terms these are
called critical fluctuations. In the context of product adoption their presence was used to predict
the micro or macro outcome of the propagation process.
7.2 Predicting unpredictable
7.2.1 Coping with the crisis
For averting systemic crisis it is crucial to prevent the coalescence of the ponzi clusters into a giant cluster.
Thus it is important for the regulator to intervene very energetically and lower i as soon as ρt approaches
ρC . This is not difficult to recognize since at this stage Nt is growing at increasing speed.
A more difficult but rewarding measure is to keep ρ0 below ρsafe, but the diagnosis for this condition
is more difficult to obtain. However, as discussed in the previous section, there are signs that indicate
whether ρt approaches the limits of the stable phase: the dynamics becomes intermittent and the chains
of contagion become longer. A rule of thumb indicating the proximity of the percolation phase transition
would be whether the failure of a company would affect typically not only its suppliers but also their
own suppliers. This technique of measuring the clustering of new contagions within the network has been
shown to be effective in predicting contagion in marketing [Solomon 2000], [Goldenberg 2005].
As mentioned at the end of Subsection 6.2 and seen in Figure 19, even if one is in the divergent phase,
if the parameters are close enough to the boundary of the stable phase, the regulator has a lot of advanced
warning signs and intervention options to stop the crisis:
1. As the trajectory of the process approaches the stable phase the number failing ponzis per unit time
slows down (Figure 14(c) around time 3-7): there is time to react.
2. To stop the process it is enough to prevent from failing those ponzis that are in danger of being
contaminated in a given time interval (Figure 14(b) around time 5-6).
3. To stop the process in the slow, narrow bottelneck stage, a slight lowering in the interest rate is
sufficient.
4. Supporting, in a targeted way, the very few ponzies (e.g. the couple of 5’s in Figure 14(a)) that are
actively failing during the slow-down of the process is relatively cheap.
5. Supporting the partners of those ponzis might be even cheaper in as far as they might only need
guarantees as means to lower their interest rate risk premium included in interest rate i. E.g.
guaranteeing the debts of the nodes 5 to the nodes 6 in Figure 14(a).
Thus, if the mere lowering of i does not help, one may consider stopping the propagation by more targeted
regulator intervention: one should guarantee to the second neighbors that the payments of the distressed
first neighbors are going to be met. This intervention is helped by the fact that the slow contagion period
might allow quite a long time for regulators’ action. In fact one may envisage a set of rules for intervention
that can be automatically enforced by computer (including credit lines opened electronically to the units
targeted for support by the regulator’s policy).
7.2.2 Treating a Minsky loan accelerator with a interest rate hike: Doing the right thing at the
wrong time
The yellow and the black vertical arrows in Figure 13 are indicating two realizations of the same policy
intervention, performed with a different intensity/timing. It is due to the effect of the network that these
two interventions can have diametrically opposite effects.
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If one wishes to deflate the debt created during an ‘irrationally exuberant’ Minsky Loan Accelerator
period, one can try to increase the interest rate i0. This, however, will increase the fraction of ponzis,
ρ0, in the system. On the map, this amounts to moving the point representing the state of the system
towards the top of the figure. If this move brings the system from the stable (squared pattern) region to
the MicroCrisis (uniform lilac) region, this leads to a successful bubble deflation with a limited price in
terms of the number of failures. Those failures are mainly the most exposed ponzi and thus constitute a
limited Schumpeter creative destruction. If however, the vertical move takes the system from the stable
region to the (striped) Minsky instability region the result is that the regulator himself triggered a major
catastrophe by his very trial to avoid it. Such instances are often encountered in the historical accounts.
In fact the wikipedia description of the beginning of the Lost Decade(s) in Japan has a striking similarity
with the scenario above.4
The policy solution is then to act locally by applying direct intervention that supports the agents
more likely to trigger, transmit or amplify a failure avalanche. As mentioned above, one rule of thumb
criterion could be to see if the second neighbors of an initially failed company (the 3’s in Figure 14(a)) are
in trouble and to provide regulator guarantees for the first neighbors (the 2’s in Figure 14(a)) debt. This
combines the minimal amount of expenses with the maximal protection from percolation of the avalanche
contagion systemic crisis. Such an algorithm has been developed in the context of network immunization
against electronic viruses [Goldenberg 2005].
Of course there are no perfect solutions: the intervention of the regulators in an ostensibly free market
has always problems of fairness, moral hazards, not to speak about the ideological reluctance to give
‘bureaucrats’ power over the free market or to help banks with the taxpayer’s money. The agent based
models can claim no superiority from this point of view, but they may have superior capabilities to offer
methods for massive searches within the trade and balance sheet data in order to select particular types
of companies to be singled out as eligible for particular surgical interventions rather then the coarse
macro-economic measures. To recurr to a medical analogy, they might help fixing the knee rather then
amputating the leg.
7.2.3 Is counter-cyclically lowering the interest stabilizing?
As seen above, the interest rate is one of the most available and controllable instruments that the regulators
have and which they may and will use whenever they feel the necessity.
In particular: should a regulator tune i opposite to N , e.g. by imposing a negative exponent, α, in
Eq. 24 (which the Fed and the ECB eventually did, following the spread of the great recession), one
would avoid (of course at the price of other risks and distortions) the run-away crisis. An example of a
convergence (admittedly quite bumpy) imposed on the loans market by an exogenously imposed negative
α is shown in Figure 15.
One can observe that the overshooting in the convergence process shown in Figure 15 is milder if the
slope of the interest rate counter-cyclical exponent is small enough : 0 < α << 1. Thus a more stabilizing
policy could be to use the central bank rate such as to keep the interest rate to the non-financial sector
constant.
However, there are changes in the inflation rate, foreign exchange, production costs, assets prices, that
are likely to throw some companies into a ponzi position by breaking the balance between the resilience
of companies and the interest rate. In fact some of these exogenous factors may amount to an effective
change in the real interest rate. The regulator may intervene in the first instance by lowering the interest
rate. However, in the case of a very dramatic deflation even an interest rate of 0 would mean a high
real interest rate, as was the case of Japan and arguably of the great recession. Some people dubbed it
‘liquidity trap’ (though Keynes probably meant something different when the introduced the term). In
such situations when the nominal interest rate cannot be lowered anymore, the regulator may resort to
intervene by guaranteeing the continuation of rolling loans at the same real interest rate. This would
insure that the credit lines that the real sector needs to continue its production would function as before
the financial troubles.
This is partially what the Japanese regulators did throughout the 1990’s in order to protect the real
4 “Recognizing that this bubble was unsustainable, the Finance Ministry sharply raised interest rates and the exchange rate
with the US $ (a geopolitical decision triggered by bilateral negotiations) in late 1989. This sharp policy caused the bursting
of the bubble, and the stock market crashed. A debt crisis followed and the Japanese banks and insurances were now loaded
with bad debts. The financial institutions were bailed out through capital infusions from the government, loans from the central
bank and the ability to postpone the recognition of losses” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lost_Decade_(Japan).
38
Figure 15: A hypothetical economy where the regulators’ policy imposes a decrease of the interest rate with the
number of defaults. The problem with this is that it might destabilize the graph of loans (trigger a new Minsky loans
accelerator) Figure 3(b). However there might exist a window where both Figure 2(b) and the present figure hold:
both the loans and the defaults loops will be stabilized.
production sector following the bubble burst (hokai) mentioned above and the ensuing massive deflation.
The same policy may be applied to households (especially in the real estate mortgages context): the
regulator may guarantee the debt that was served for a long enough period before the crisis moment (and
thus proved solvent in normal economic conditions).
7.3 Assumptions underlying our model
Until a fully computerized system to administrate policy can be supported by a ‘real time’ data acquisition
system, and until a software policy enforcing platform can administrate it in a localized targeted way, one
is limited to use the diagram in Figure 13 as a static and macro tool to analyse the short term prospects
of the system.
The assumptions underlying such a use are the short term (on a scale of weeks) reliability of the
parameters:
γ : At the level of weeks, the financial ties are stable, the resilience of the individual agents may change
but the system as a network maintains macroscopically the same critical density ρC and a critical
exponent γ.
α : The coefficient α governing the interest rate dependence on the defaults is also static at this time
scale: in Europe, the policy decisions on the key interest rate are chosen once per month at the
ECB during the Governing Council meeting, when the ECB assesses the economic situation and the
stance of the monetary policy.
β : The density of ponzi companies in the system, ρt, is a variable that microscopically can change on a
daily basis (when the payments are due then the ponzi agents can default). However, the stochastic
heterogeneity exponent β is likely to remain stable.
Some of these parameters are under the regulator’s influence and could be targeted within the policy
guided by the diagram: For example, the exponent β can be affected by changing the tax policy, with
different regulations for the agents with large and those with small incomes. Under such a policy, the
distribution of agents’ resilience will change considerably and the diagram in Figure 13 would have to be
reproduced.
In a more developed data acquisition environment, the diagram 13 can also be used in conjunction
with dynamic simulations into which the real time parameters/events (for example the redesigned network
after a large shock such as bankruptcy of a major company, natural disaster etc.) would be fed and the
phases of the system would have to be re-established as frequently as the data allows. In the absence of
genuinely micro-resolution tools, the diagram 13 can be used as an additional tool to the already existing
procedures for the ECB council to simulate which changes in the phases of the system would happen with
a planned change of the interest rate.
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7.4 Dealing with uncertainty of the global stochastic parameters
The statistical methods used in the present article circumvent the necessity of microscopic knowledge of
each company and each trade connection, and reduce it to the knowledge of global parameters such as ρ0,
α, β, γ etc. Even if one stops here, the evaluation of those parameters (or operationally equivalent ones)
will demand at least the kind of effort and will face similar problems to the neoclassical macro-econometric
approach. For difficulties to extract reliably quantitative connections between macro-economic measur-
ables see [Rogoff 2010] and their criticism by [Herndon 2013], and [Alesina 2010] and their criticism by
[Guajardo 2010].
Moreover, the famous complaint of decision makers against ambidextrous economists (Harry Tru-
man:“Give me a one-handed economist”), would be expanded to complaints about models that depend
on yet a larger (and unfamiliar!) number of empirically difficult to determine new quantities:
β : The resilience heterogeneity parametrized by the exponent β is not easy to establish. Not only
that it depends on companies’ balance sheet data that are not always available or reliable, but also
it is likely to depend on the financial structure of the economy and the details of the conditions in
which the debt was acquired, more specifically, the debt structure (long vs short term, with risk
premium or not, with strong or weak collaterals, old debt or rolling credit etc).
α : The influence of the individual failures on the interest rate is parametrized by α and it is even more
elusive and dependent on circumstances. The same event (a company failure) can be perceived in
a more severe or more light perspective depending on media coverage, other contemporary events,
etc. Moreover different banks may impose different rates to different borrowers, transforming the
global parameter α, too, into a microscopically inhomogenous one. Of course one can still organize
a systematic measurement connecting the volume of failures in a time span with the interest rate
and extract an average α.
γ : The parameter γ describes the influence of the network geometry on the size of the contagion
avalanches and in particular the way their sizes diverge to systemic dimensions as one increases the
ponzi density. Calibrating γ it is not less difficult than the other parameters:
1. As mentioned previously, it is not even clear that the simple percolation (rather than the Ising
or bootstrap percolation [Kindler 2013]) picture is the correct one.
2. the links of the network have in reality very different weights.
3. The access to the details of the trade connections between companies is even more limited by
privacy rules then the balance sheet data. The debt connections between financial institutions
are somewhat easier to deal with. These connections were monitored by central banks under
the previous regulatory regimes.
4. The entire network is never complete: even having data for an entire country leaves the imports
and export data for individual companies undefined to a large extent.
5. The network of trade connections is not stable: every year a fraction (10%) of the companies
go bankrupt and are replaced by other trade partners in the network connections.
And one can go on with those qualifications indefinitely.
ρ0 : To create a diagram as in Figure 13, one needs to know the values of ρC and ρ0. For this, in
turn, one has to monitor the financial ties between the agents, as well as their ‘ponziness’. However,
the network links can denote different types of ties between the economic agents, depending on the
domain of analysis. It is of particular interest to focus on credit relationships, on exposures between
banks and on liquidity flows in the interbank payment system, as such network connections add
on the ponzi status in a dynamic way. However, relevant ties are also created between the agents
that share common assets [Battiston 2012] or by companies residing in the same geographic location
(sharing the same households as labor and/or as consumers).
The hope of the simplifications leading to the phase diagram 13 is that the existence of the sharp
phase frontiers between such different phases may ensure that much of the dramatic transitions based on
the above abstractions may remain, even after introducing the entire host of realistic empirical details.
The strategical message of the agent based model is that one should organize the monitoring capabilities
of the regulators to a much higher resolution level: by analogy, one would never expect the traffic jams in
a city to be resolved only on the basis of global parameters, such as the number of cars per meter or on
the average speed.
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Until then we may congratulate ourselves with the fact that according to our model, the network, top-
down and bottom-up parameters appear often in the combination αβγ which reduces greatly the number
of effective empirical parameters to calibrate and reduces drastically the sensitivity to their errors.
7.4.1 Examples of models relaxing / modifying assumptions of the present model
In the above we assumed statistical macroscopic homogeneity within the microscopically inhomogenous
network of agents. By this we mean that while microscopically companies have different rank (numbers
of partners), different resiliences, different clustering coefficients, at the macroscopic scale, the probability
to find a certain rank, resilience or clustering coefficient does not change significantly between various
regions of the network.
This, of course, is not necessarily the case in the real world: and one may consider systems that are
formed by connected but different sub-networks [Erez 2005] or other localized departures from macroscopic
statistical uniformity [Cohen 2003]. However in that case, rather then depending on a finite number of
global geometrical parameters, the empirical predictions will depend on the additional microscopic or
mesoscopic information as it was feared by Hayek long ago [Hayek 1948].
Moreover, in the case in which each company has many contacts it becomes non-realistic to assume
that it can be failed by the fall of just one partner and one has to take into account the weighted influence
of all its connections as described in [Kindler 2013]. The relevant formalism for that case has been shown
in [Kindler 2013] to be ‘bootstrap percolation’ which is outside the scope of the present exposition.
Another issue is the reaction of the system to the crisis percolation attack. Of course in this case the
network macroscopic uniformity assumption is broken: the reaction causes the system to behave differently
at the locations under attack. Examples of such ‘anti-viral’ reaction affecting the system properties have
been studied in [Hershberg 2001] and [Goldenberg 2005]. Singling out the regions with more contagion
activity and characterizing their geometry has been the very engine of predicting very early and very
precisely the future of real propagation campaigns [Goldenberg 2005].
7.4.2 ‘Noise’ as information
As mentioned a few times above, the increase in the fractality of the clusters and in the intermittency
of the time evolution are valuable as information that identifies the state of the system and can be used
for predicting its future behavior: the agent based analysis in this paper connects the amplitude and the
extent of the fractal clusters, intermittent fluctuations and non-self averaging deviations to the proximity
of a percolation transition.
The presence of large fluctuations indicates that the current density of ponzis, ρt, is close to the
critical value, ρC , and most likely advancing in the Minsky instability region. It was often been observed
[Sornette 2002], [Louzoun 2002] that the proximity of a crisis is signalled by large fluctuations in the time
evolution of the system. In such an instance the regulator has to intervene energetically to prevent failures
and to reduce, at least temporarily, the interest rate: the prospects are that in the absence of such an
intervention, even without an external shock N0, a macro crisis may spontaneously emerge which would
wipe out the entire population of ponzi companies. Such a shock would likely transmit to the rest of the
economy.
8 Conclusions: Seeing ‘it’ as THEM
A crucial aspect emerging from the present study of the Minsky accelerator on economic networks is the
irrelevance of statistical averages. While one can define an average over different realizations of the system,
this average will often be irrelevant for any one individual realization; once specific individual rare events
can trigger systemic changes, they cause the system to take dramatically different time trajectories. The
most significant fact about the predictions is that the most singular effects or most singular features in
space and time are the ones which are ultimately responsible for the macroscopic behavior of the entire
system. This is in sharp contrast with the usual procedure of considering the most likely or average
behavior of the whole system. Taking averages over the various realizations would make as much sense as
taking the average between a dead cat and a cat alive in the classical Schroedinger’s Gedankenexperiment
[Schroedinger 1935].
Wondering what Minsky would have said about the origins of the current crisis [Wray 2012], [Wray 2013]
one may reach a general thought: Since the causality of an emergent macro-phenomenon cannot be pinned
41
on a particular micro-individual or event [LLS 2000], insisting on finding a single cause to a systemic crisis
would be like insisting on searching for the first (or last) individual of a crowd that trampled over the
victim of a stampede. Of course one should rather be looking rather for the organizers of the occasion
that created the conditions that allowed the stampede to happen. And possibly look for an alternative
organization making those conditions unlikely to happen again.
Microscopic heterogeneity, autocataliticity and granularity are key factors for the description and
prediction of the non-equilibrium reality. We refer to the words of Phillip W. Anderson:
“Much of the real world is controlled as much by the ‘tails’ of distributions as by means or
averages: by the exceptional, not the mean; by the catastrophe, not the steady drip; by the very
rich, not the middle class. We need to free ourselves from ‘average’ thinking.” [Anderson 1997]
Thus, in order to catch, in real time, the beginning of a macroscopic process, one has to keep an eye
on each of the microeconomic agents involved.
The first step is to establish the study of the economic network properties as one of the intrinsic
tasks of the economic regulators and watchdogs. Resources of the size presently invested in collecting and
processing data for constructing DSGE models should be invested in collecting and processing data for
constructing network (agent based) characterizations of the economy.
Such an effort can be made along a few directions:
- measuring directly the properties of the economic units and their connections;
- probing the system continuously for its failure propagation parameters: in spite of the Minsky
mechanism, failure clusters do not jump directly from size 1 to the system dimensions;
- watching the degree of propagation of micro-crises to alert the regulator to the imminence of larger
ones;
- learning about the network properties not only from the propagation of failures but also from the
propagation of milder signals (growth, shrink, crisies of particular instruments etc);
- identifying clusters and nodes connecting those clusters;
- putting in place ‘sensors’ in the accounting system that can evaluate the changes in the resilience of
units and in their interactions;
- putting in place simulation systems that can evaluate the effects of those changes.
As is often the case, the contribution of a new approach is not only in helping to address old questions
from a new angle but also, and foremost, to ask new questions that would not even have been able to be
formulated in the old approach. The present agent-based approach, structured around the geometrical
network obstructions to failure contagion, allows a list of new concepts that can effectively assist the
debate around optimal economic policies, both at the macro and at the individual agent level: the local
fluctuations, the propagation delays, the fixed points, the phase transition boundaries are all related
to interscale interactions that amplify the micro-events to macroscopic processes which trigger or block
systemic changes. It is thus an appropriate conclusion of this paper to propose an interdisciplinary research
program where the detailed properties of the companies, their trade and their growth are documented at
the greatest possible resolution.
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Appendices
The appendices provide derivations and additional examples to describe the models introduced in the
main text. The models include both the microscopic and the macroscopic properties of the system and
also their interrelatedness. The analysis provides predictions of the response of the system to the changes
in system parameters and thus to the system’s robustness. There are four appendices providing details of
systems described in the four Sections of the paper: 3, 4, 5, 6.
A Evolution of the loans quantities during the autocatalytic Marshall-Walras
equalization process in loans market with decreasing returns
This appendix gives some additional mathematical derivation of the iterative processes in which the
supplier (here a lender) reacts to an excess demand by modifying their price (the interest rate) while the
customer (debtor) reacts to the new price by modifying the quantity they demand (the amount borrowed),
leading to the Marshall-Walras equilibrium, as described in Section 3.1. The impact of such changes in the
interest rate on the amount borrowed in the economy and vice-versa, are treated under a ceterus paribus
assumption. This loan market is based on the following two assumptions:
47
- The total amount of loans, Nloans, demanded by the debtors at any one time t is a decreasing
power law function of the interest rate, it, that they have to pay at that time:
Nloans(t) = Nt =
(
it
k
)−µ
(46)
where {k, µ} > 0.
- The interest rate, it+1, that the banks are charging in the following period is an increasing power
law function of the amount of loans set in the previous period, Nt:
it+1 = i0N
α
t (47)
where α > 0.
These equations determine the interplay between the amount of the loans outstanding, Nt, and the interest
rate, it, as follows:
N0
Eq.47−−−−→ i1 Eq.46−−−−→ N1 Eq.47−−−−→ i2 · · ·Nt Eq.47−−−−→ it+1 Eq.46−−−−→ Nt+1 · · · (48)
Introducing the equillibrium condition it+1=it and Nt = Nt−1 in Eqs. 46 and 47:
i = i0
(
i
k
)−αµ
(49)
N =
(
i0
k
)−µ
N−αµ (50)
one can express the fixed point (Nfix, ifix) in terms of the initial interest rate i0 (note that the point does
not depend on the initial value of N0). So by rewriting Eqs. 49 and 50, it can be expressed in terms of
just the initial interest rate i0:
(Nfix, ifix) =
((
i0
k
) −µ
1+αµ
,
(
i0
kαµ
) 1
1+αµ
)
(51)
This iterative proces is visually represented in Figure 16, for both αµ < 1 and αµ > 1.
By repeated application of Eqs. 46 and 47 and then using Eq. 51, one can express the number of loans
in terms of the number of loans at the fixed point Nfix:
Nt =
(
it
k
)−µ
=
(
i0
k
)−µ
N−αµt−1 =
(
i0
k
)−µ(1−αµ)
N
−(αµ)2
t−2 =(
i0
k
)−µ(1−αµ−(αµ)2)
N
−(αµ)3
t−3 = · · · =
(
i0
k
)−µ(1−αµ−(αµ)2−···−(αµ)(t−1))
N
−(αµ)t
0 =(
i0
k
)−µ 1+(αµ)t1+αµ
N
−(αµ)t
0 = N
1+(αµ)t
fix N
−(αµ)t
0 = Nfix
[
N0
Nfix
]−(αµ)t
(52)
This fixed point can be attractive, in which case the system converges to it, or repulsive. Iff |αµ| < 1 the
fixed point is stable. A proof of that in given in the Appendix C. A more elaborated and complete proof
of convergence can be found in [Galor 2007].
B Evolution of the loans quantities during the autocatalytic Marshall-Walras
equalization process in loans market with increasing returns
This appendix gives a mathematical derivation of the coevolution of loans Nloans and the interest rate i
introduced in Section 3.2. This loan market differs from that described in Appendix A in the reaction of
lenders to an increase in the credit demand. Instead of an increase in borrowing leading to an increase in
the interest rate, it here leads to a decrease. This is motivated by increasing returns to scale; the more
that is lent, the cheaper is the process associated with arranging and monitoring loans. So this process is
based on the following two assumptions:
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(a) Visualisation of the law of decreasing returns,
Eq. 48, in which the red line, Eq. 47, represents the
increasing price of loans as their demand increases,
while the blue line represents the decreasing demand
for loans as their price increases, Eq. 46. Here αµ <
1, so the loan market, Nloan and i, converges to a
fixed equilibrium point irrespective of their initial
values (in this case (N0, i0) = (2, 0.2%)).
(b) Similar to Figure 16(a) with the difference that
now αµ > 1. This entails either that the banks react
to a decrease of demand for loans by decreasing the
interest rate very strongly, or that the borrowers react
to an increase in the interest rate by decreasing their
demand very strongly, or both. This brings the sys-
tem into a state of a temporary disequilibrium until it
reaches the minimum value of demand. Here the initial
values are (N0, i0) = (12, 0, 2%).
Figure 16: Illustration of the Marshall-Walras iterative procedure of equilibrating the number of loans and the interest
rate, in a market with decreasing returns, Eq. 48. If the decrease of returns (coefficient µ) is faster then the demand
for loans (coefficient 1/α) then the fluctuations in the system become larger, with Nloans → 0, i→ 0.
- As before, the amount of loans Nloans demanded by the debtors is a decreasing power law function
of the interest rate that they have to pay:
Nloans(t) = Nt =
(
it
k
)−µ
(53)
where {k, µ} > 0.
- But now the assumption concerning the interest rate, it+1, that the banks are charging is that it is
a decreasing power law function of the amount of loans Nt borrowed in the previous period:
it+1 = i0N
−α
t (54)
where α > 0.
Again these equations determine the interplay between the amount of loans, Nt, and the interest rate, it,
as follows:
N0
Eq.54−−−−→ i1 Eq.53−−−−→ N1 Eq.54−−−−→ i2 · · ·Nt Eq.54−−−−→ it+1 Eq.53−−−−→ Nt+1 · · · (55)
This iterative process is visually represented in Figure 17.
Introducing the equilibrium condition it+1=it and Nt = Nt−1 in Eqs. 53 and 54 gives:
i = i0
(
i
k
)αµ
(56)
N =
(
i0
k
)−µ
Nαµ (57)
The resulting fixed point (Nfix, ifix) depends only the initial interest rate i0, not on the initial value of
the amount of loans, N0. The fixed point is therefore equal to:
(Nfix, ifix) =
((
i0
k
) −µ
1−αµ
,
(
i0
kαµ
) 1
1−αµ
)
. (58)
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(a) When αµ < 1, the iterative process Eq.
55 converges to the fixed point irrespective of
the initial values N0 and i0 (shown here are
two cases (N0, i0) = (2, 0.18%)) and (N0, i0) =
(900, 0.18%))
(b) When αµ > 1, the iterative process Eq. 55 di-
verges from the fixed point irrespective of the ini-
tial values N0 and i0 (shown here are two cases
(N0, i0) = (2, 0.18%)) and (N0, i0) = (900, 0.18%))
Figure 17: Coevolution of the loan quantity and the interest rate during the autocatalytic Marshall-Walras equaliza-
tion process in a loan market with increasing returns for the lenders.
The fixed point can be either attractive, in which case the system converges to it, or repulsive. Iff
|αµ| < 1 the fixed point is stable. A proof of this is given in Appendix C. A more elaborated and complete
proof of convergence can be found in [Galor 2007]
By regrouping Eqs. 53, 54 and 58 one can express the number of loans at any time in terms of the
number of loans at the fixed point Nfix:
Nt =
(
it
k
)−µ
=
(
i0
k
)−µ
Nαµt−1 =
(
i0
k
)−µ(1+αµ)
N
(αµ)2
t−2 =(
i0
k
)−µ(1+αµ+(αµ)2)
N
(αµ)3
t−3 = · · · =
(
i0
k
)−µ(1+αµ+(αµ)2+···+(αµ)(t−1))
N
(αµ)t
0 =(
i0
k
)−µ 1−(αµ)t1−αµ
N
(αµ)t
0 = N
1−(αµ)t
fix N
(αµ)t
0 = Nfix
[
N0
Nfix
](αµ)t
(59)
C Evolution of the autocatalytic Minsky crisis accelerator process based on
the non-spatial model
The objective of the present Appendix is to explain the details of the method of analysis of the autocatalytic
processes introduced in the Section 4, in terms of finding the fixed point of the iterative processes generated
by the interactions and feedbacks between the number of ponzi companies Nponzi and the interest rate i.
This model is non-spatial (it ignores the credit/debt network or other contagion effects, such as holding
common assets). It assumes that the interest rate, i, determines, through the heterogeneous distribution
of the individual resilience, r(n), of the companies, the fraction of units in the system that are ponzi. The
resilience of a company n is defined as the ratio of its earnings to its debt:
r(n) =
earnings(n)
debt(n)
. (60)
Assuming that the earnings and the nominal debts of each company do not change in the short term, e.g.
during the financial crisis, its ability to pay its interest charge would depend only on the variation of the
nominal interest rate i. More precisely, the company n would become ponzi if the interest rate i exceeds
its resilience: i > r(n). Thus the resilience, r(n), of company n is the lowest level of the interest rate, i,
which renders the company n ponzi. In other words, the resilience r(n) is the largest value of the interest
rate which still allows company n to pay the interest on its debt without incurring further debt.
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We consider a set of Ntot companies with heterogeneous level of resilience. For definiteness (and based
on empirical data [Takayasu 2000]), we take the distribution of company resiliences to be a Pareto or Zipf
power law with a heterogeneity exponent β. That means that the probability that a company will have
ponzi status (its resilience r(n) lower than a given interest rate i) is:
Prob[r(n) < i] =
(
i
rmax
)β
(61)
where rmax is the maximum value of resilience found in the given set of Ntot companies. The heterogeneity
exponent β is typically found to take a value between 1 and 2.
Consequently, given the total number of companies in the system, Ntot, the number of ponzi companies,
N(i), depends as a power law on the interest rate i:
N(i) = NtotP [r(n) < i] = Ntot ×
(
i
rmax
)β
=
(
i
k
)β
(62)
where we have introduced a new constant k = rmax/N
1/β
tot > 0 for the sake of simplicity. So, in our
financial accelerator model, an increase in the interest rate at certain moment t, it, leads to an increase
in the number of ponzi companies, Nt, according to Eq. 62:
Nt= Nponzi(t) =
(
it
k
)β
(63)
An increase in the number of ponzi, all of which are seen to have failed, increases the interest rate; the
banks increase interest rate not only if the demand for credit is increased but also if there is an increase in
the number of their clients that are not fulfilling their debt obligations. The increase on the interest rate
reduces resilience endogenously. The mechanism that the banks apply when adjusting interest rate may
be modeled in different ways. In our current analysis we will use a specific power law relation between
the number of ponzi (or distressed) companies at a given time t, Nt, and the interest rate, it+1, that they
induce in the next period.
it+1 = i0N
α
t (64)
The Eqs. 63 and 64 define an iterative process where, starting from a certain initial interest rate, i0,
and an exogenous shock consisting of the failure of N0 companies, a chain reaction is triggered:
N0
Eq.64−−−−→ i1 Eq.63−−−−→ N1 Eq.64−−−−→ i2 · · ·Nt Eq.64−−−−→ it+1 Eq.63−−−−→ Nt+1 · · · (65)
The analysis below is exactly exploring the properties of the iterative process Eqs. 63, 64 and preparing
the tools for the similar analysis of the network model where the system has more than one fixed point.
Eqs. 63 and 64 specify the reciprocal influences (feedbacks) between the number of ponzi companies
(that are assumed to have failed) and the interest rate in the next time period. To see the iterative process
resulting from such equations, assume that one starts in an initial state with interest rate i0. Assume a
shock occurs that makes a number, N0, of companies ponzi, i.e. leads to their failure. According Eq. 64
this event will jump the interest rate in the next period to:
i1 = i0N
α
0 . (66)
Following this rise in the interest rate, some of the companies which until now were viable (speculative:
with the old interest rate, i0, they were able to pay interest on their own debts (r(n) > i0) will become
ponzi. More precisely, all the companies with resilience r(n) < i1 = i0N
α
0 will now be ponzi. According
to Eq. 63, the total number of ponzi companies will be:
N1 =
(
i1
k
)β
=
(
i0
k
Nα0
)β
=
(
i0
k
)β
Nαβ0 . (67)
Let’s assume for definiteness (we will study all the cases below) that the parameters are such that N1 > N0.
The new, increased number of ponzi companies, N1, induces in turn, according to Eq. 64 a new increased
interest rate:
i2 = i0N
α
1 =
(
i0
k
)1+αβ
kNα
2β
0 (68)
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which in turn leads to a larger number of ponzi companies:
N2 =
(
i2
k
)β
=
(
i0
k
Nα1
)β
=
(
i0
k
)β
Nαβ1 =
(
i0
k
)(1+αβ)β
Nα
2β2
0 . (69)
The new number of ponzi companies has systemic consequences and it raises the interest rate to the value:
i3 = i0N
α
2 =
(
i0
k
)1+αβ+α2β2
kNα
3β2
0 . (70)
which in turn leads to a higher number of ponzi companies:
N3 =
(
i3
k
)β
=
(
i0
k
)(1+αβ+α2β2)β
Nα
3β3
0 . (71)
In general, after a number of iterations, t, the interest rate will be:
it =
(
i0
k
)1+αβ+α2β2+···+α−1β−1
kNα
tβt−1
0 (72)
and the number of ponzi companies will be:
Nt =
(
i0
k
)(1+αβ+α2β2)β+···+αt−1βt−1
Nα
tβt
0 . (73)
For αβ 6= 1, the geometric series in the exponents of Eqs. 72 and 73 can be summed, which brings the
equations into their compact forms:
it =
(
i0
k
) 1−αtβt
1−αβ
kNα
tβt−1
0 (74)
and
Nt =
(
i0
k
) 1−αtβt
1−αβ
Nα
tβt
0 . (75)
From these equations one can easily discuss the outcome of the process. More precisely, one may
compute under which conditions the process will continue after the initial Minsky moment, under which
conditions it will diverge into a crisis and under which conditions it will converge and stop at a fixed
point. Moreover, if the ponzi status is reversible, the system can also develop towards a recovery.
To clarify the similarity to the Walrasian way of computing the equilibrium state, note that if such
an equilibrium / static state (it=∞, Nt=∞) exists for Eqs. 74, 75, this state will be a fixed point solution,
(Nfix, ifix), of the system Eqs. 63, 64:
it+1 = it = i0N
α
t (76)
Nt+1 = Nt =
(
it
k
)β
(77)
which is easily solved by substitution:
i = i0
(
i
k
)αβ
(78)
N =
(
i0N
α
k
) β
1−αβ
(79)
and gives:
ifix =
(
i0k
−αβ) 11−αβ (80)
Nfix =
(
i0
k
) β
1−αβ
(81)
When αβ < 1, this result is indeed the same result that is obtained by taking t→∞ limit in the Eqs.
74 and 75, since then αβ∞ = 0, and these equations reduce to Eqs. 80, 81, respectively. Note that in this
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case, for a given i0 the final equilibrium point is (Nt=∞, it=∞) = (Nfix, ifix) and does not depend on the
initial value of N0.
Of course the fixed point given by Eqs. 80, 81:
(Nfix, ifix) =
((
i0
k
) β
1−αβ
,
(
i0
kαβ
) 1
1−αβ
)
(82)
is the same for αβ > 1 but its role in the process 74, 75 is very different: it is not anymore an attractive,
but it is a repulsive point.
Indeed by regrouping Eq. 75 in the form:
Nt =
(
i0
k
) β
1−αβ
(
i0
k
)−β(αtβt)
1−αβ
Nα
tβt
0
=
(
i0
k
) β
1−αβ
[(
i0
k
) −β
1−αβ
N0
]αtβt
=
(
i0
k
) β
1−αβ
[
N0
Nfix
]αtβt
= Nfix
[
N0
Nfix
](αβ)t
(83)
one sees that for αβ > 1 the exponent αtβt of
[
N0
Nfix
]
rather then vanishing for t → ∞, diverges. Thus
rather than (Nt→∞, it→∞) converging towards (Nfix, ifix), the opposite happens: if the initial point N0
is even slightly smaller N0 < Nfix then Nt→∞ → 0 while if N0 > Nfix, N increases until the entire system
is ponzi. This unrealistic feature is corrected by the network model where even for systemic crises only
part of the companies fail.
In conclusion, the dynamics defined by the iterative process Eqs. 63, 64 has two possible outcomes:
- when αβ < 1 the system converges after a crisis to a fixed interest rate and fixed number of ponzi
companies;
- when αβ > 1 the system either flows in a state with very low interest rate where there are no ponzi
companies or in a state where the entire system becomes ponzi and the interest rate diverges.
Graphical representation of convergence/divergence. On a double logarithmic graph Figure 18 with
the number of ponzi companies, N , on the horizontal axis and the interest rate i, on the vertical axis, the
Eqs. 63 and 64 are straight lines, as shown in Figure 18:
- the red line gives the interest rate as a function of the number of ponzi companies, determined by
Eq. 64, as a line with a slope equal to α:
ln(it+1) = α ln(Nt) + ln(i0) (84)
- the blue dashed line plots how many ponzi companies there are in the system, as given by using Eq.
63. Please note that in the graphical representation Eq. 63 is ‘inverted’, because of the interest rate,
i, being on the vertical axis, and the number of ponzi companies, N , on the horizontal axis:
ln(it) = (1/β) ln(Nt) + ln(k) (85)
When αβ < 1, the fixed point, as defined by Eq. 83, is a stable attracting point. For any initial
number of ponzi companies, the system reaches (after sufficient time) the fixed point. This is graphically
represented in Figure 18(a). The choice of parameters in this illustration of a basic autocatalytic process
is as follows: initial interest rate i0 = 0.4%, initial number of ponzi companies N0 = 2 or N
∗
0 = 900,
α = 0.5, β = 1.3 and k = 0.0015. The figure shows that the position of the two lines is such that left
of the fixed point the blue dashed line is above the red solid line and therefore it+1 > it, so the interest
rate and the number of ponzi companies grow with every new iteration towards the fixed point. In the
area which is on the right-hand side of the fixed point, the red solid line is above the blue dashed line
and therefore it+1 < it i.e. the values of the interest rate and the number of ponzi companies decreases
towards the fixed point.
When αβ > 1 the fixed point is unstable and the dynamics brings the system away from (Nfix, ifix).
This is shown in the following example and Figure 18(b). We chose: β = 1.8, α = 0.75, k = 0.005, and
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(a) Number of ponzi companies and interest rate
in two possible developments of the system when
the fixed point is stable, αβ < 1. Here β = 1.3,
α = 0.5, i0 = 0.4% and k = 0.0015. The initial
number of ponzi companies is set either to N0 = 2
or to N∗0 = 900. In both cases after an initial
shock the system converges towards Nfix = 38.
(b) Number of ponzi companies and interest rate in
two possible developments of the system when the
fixed point is not stable, αβ > 1. Here β = 1.8, α =
0.75, i0 = 0.003 and k = 0.005. The initial number
of ponzi companies is set either to N0 = 12 to N
∗
0 =
16. In both cases the system diverges; in the first
case the number of ponzi companies decreases, while
in the second it increases.
Figure 18: Evolution of the autocatalytic Minsky crisis accelerator process based on the non-spatial model. The
mechanism determining the number of ponzi companies, Eq. 63, is given by the red line. The mechanism determining
the interest rate, Eq. 64, is given by the blue line. 18(a): αβ < 1 so that the fixed point is attractive; 18(b): αβ > 1
the fixed point is repulsive.
i0 = 0.3%. The fixed point becomes (Nfix, ifix)=(14, 2.1%). From Eq. 83 one sees that starting from
below Nfix, given by Eq. 81, the process goes to lower N ; while starting above Nfix the process diverges
to larger N . Therefore, if one starts at N0 = 12 then N0 < Nfix and the number of ponzi companies goes
down with each iteration; in the graphical representation, this means that the red solid curve is above
the blue dashed curve. If one starts with N0 = 16 which is larger then the Nfix = 14 then the number of
ponzi increases and this leads to a crisis.
Fixed point stability. Eqs. 84 and 85 represent a system of two linear difference equations:
ln(it+1) = α ln(Nt) + ln(i0)
ln(Nt+1) = β ln(it+1)− β ln(k) = αβ ln(Nt) + β ln(i0/k). (86)
This system can be conveniently rewritten in matrix form as:[
ln(it+1)
ln(Nt+1)
]
=
[
0 α
0 αβ
] [
ln(it)
ln(Nt)
]
+
[
ln(i0)
β ln(i0/k)
]
. (87)
Let’s denote the matrix A as:
A =
[
0 α
0 αβ
]
. (88)
Stability theorem: The first-order matrix difference equation 87 is stable – that is, converges asymptot-
ically to the steady state
[
ln(ifix)
ln(Nfix)
]
– if and only if all eigenvalues of the transition matrix A (whether
real or complex) have an absolute value which is less than 1. For its proof see one of the textbooks on
linear difference equations, such as [Galor 2007].
The eigenvalues of the given matrix A are the solutions of the equation:
det (λI −A) = λ1(λ2 − αβ)− 0 = 0 (89)
λ1 = 0 and λ2 = αβ. (90)
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Therefore, the condition for asymptotic stability of the system 86 is:
|αβ| < 1. (91)
D Evolution of the Minsky accelerator process based on the network model
The non-spatial model from the previous Appendix doesn’t take into account the credit/debt relationships
between companies, their common assets nor any other network effects. The network effect in the context
of debt is crucially important, since the direct link between a failed debtor and its creditor has immediate
consequences to the creditor.
Let us consider that we have a network of companies. The network may be directed or undirected, with
either a fixed or a variable number of neighbors and with arbitrary clustering properties. The analysis
given in the present Appendix depends on only two parameters of the network: its critical density, ρC ,
and the critical exponent, γ, which we now define.
The companies represent the nodes of a network. In general, given a set of nodes (also called sites),
a network is defined by the links (or edges) which connect these nodes. Nodes that are connected by a
link are ‘neighbors’. A link may be either directed or undirected. If a link is ‘directed’ then one of the
two nodes made neighbors by it, is named the origin of the link and the other the target of the link. The
concept of percolation is introduced by declaring some nodes as ‘susceptible’, i.e. capable of becoming
‘contaminated’ if only one of their neighbors (origins if the links are directed) is already ‘contaminated’.
Of course this contamination rule provides the possibility of contamination avalanches: the contaminated
nodes can contaminate new nodes (their susceptible neighbors) which in turn may contaminate additional
nodes (their own susceptible neighbors) and so on. The crucial concept in percolation is the concept of
cluster; imagine one starts a contamination avalanche by contaminating one node. The avalanche triggered
by this will go on until there are no susceptible sites (nodes) neighboring any of the currently contaminated
nodes. Such a set of susceptible nodes that can contaminate one another (directly or indirectly through
the contamination of intermediate susceptible nodes) but not any additional susceptible nodes, is said to
form a cluster.
The crucial property of many networks is that in the limit of infinite size system, the size of the largest
cluster, N , diverges once the fraction, ρ, of (randomly distributed) susceptible nodes approaches a certain
critical value, ρC . In particular, for many types of networks the divergence follows a universal ‘scaling’
law:
Nt = S
[
1− ρt
ρC
]−γ
(92)
with ρC and γ independent of the details of the particular assignment of the links or of the susceptible
nodes in the network [Stauffer 1979]. S > 0 is a constant related with the exact way the contagion process
is initialized (see [Cantono 2010]).
As it turns out, this property will extend the analysis of Appendix C to a more realistic system. In
Appendix C we assumed that as soon as a company, n, is ponzi (i.e. r(n) < i) the system recognizes it
as such and the global dynamics is affected through an increase in the interest rate according to Eq. 64:
it+1 = i0N
α
t . In reality, the exact financial status of each company is not known, not even to its trading
partners; thus, without additional external events, a ponzi company would be treated as a normal one. It is
only when the distress of the company is highlighted by negative events in its immediate environment that
the company is recognized and treated as such by the system. The conditions required for a company’s
distress to become public may vary. For instance in [Kindler 2013] one considered the cumulative influence
of its neighbors.
Here we will use a minimal extension of the model in Appendix C: we will assume that for a ponzi
company to be recognized as such (‘uncovered’), it is enough that one of its ponzi neighbors is uncovered.
One is lead to a network model in which the ponzis are identified with the susceptible nodes and which,
through their business or financial links, can contaminate one another into open distress. The difference
between the usual percolation problem and the present one is provided by the feedback loop of Appendix
C: as the size of the cluster of contaminated ponzis, Nt, expands, cf. Eq. 92, the interest rate, it, increases,
cf. Eq. 64, and the fraction of ponzi companies, i.e. susceptible nodes, Nsus, increases too, according to
Eq. 62, which leads to an increase of density of susceptible nodes:
ρt =
Nsus(t)
Ntot
=
(it/k)
β
Ntot
=
(
it
rmax
)β
. (93)
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By substituting Eq. 93 in Eq. 92 one obtains the dependence of the number of openly contaminated
companies, Nt, as a function of the interest rate, it:
Nt = S
[
1−
(
it
iC
)β]−γ
(94)
where iC , according to Eq. 93, is defined as iC = ρ
1/β
C rmax. So, by introducing the contamination by a
network neighbor as an additional condition for a ponzi company to be recognized and to be acted upon
as such, we just substitute for Eq. 63 in the previously defined iterative process (Eqs. 63, 64), the Eq. 94.
While slightly more complicated then system 63, 64, the new iterative process has the same structure:
N0
Eq.64−−−−→ i1 Eq.94−−−−→ N1 Eq.64−−−−→ i2 · · ·Nt Eq.64−−−−→ it+1 Eq.94−−−−→ Nt+1 · · · (95)
As in the case of Eqs. 63 and 64, the key to understanding the phase diagram of the process is to find the
fixed points, i.e. the solutions of the system:
Nfix = S
[
1−
(
ifix
iC
)β]−γ
(96)
ifix = i0N
α
fix. (97)
By substituting Eq. 97 into Eq. 96, the problem is reduced to finding the solutions of the equation:
Nfix = S
[
1−
(
i0N
α
fix
iC
)β]−γ
(98)
which, by replacing iC = ρ
1/β
C rmax (Eq. 93), can be rewritten as:
Nfix = S
[
1− ρ0
ρC
Nαβfix
]−γ
. (99)
The network based process Eq. 95 is visualized in the examples given in Figure 19, for various values
of the parameters, similarly to the way Figures 18(a) and 18(b) described various cases of the non-
network process. One sees in these figures (and will calculate below) that in the network case the function
determining the number of uncovered ponzi companies, which we will call ‘failed’, Eq. 96, is now a curve
which intersects the straight line representing the interest rate mechanism, Eq. 97, either in two points
or not at all, corresponding to the number of solutions of Eq. 98, as shown graphically in Figures 19(b)
and 19(a), respectively. In Figure 19(b), the two fixed points, one convergent and the other divergent, are
labelled (Nconv, iconv) and (Ndiv, idiv), respectively.
In order to evaluate quantitatively the crossing points defined above, we re-write Eq. 98 as:(
Nfix
S
)1/γ [
1−
(
i0
iC
)β
Nαβfix
]
= 1 (100)
and further as: (
Nfix
S
)1/γ [
1−
(
i0
iC
)β
Nαβfix
]
= 1 (101)
i.e.
F (Nfix) =
(
i0
iC
)β
N
αβ+1/γ
fix −N1/γfix + S1/γ = 0. (102)
Assuming αβγ = 1, Eq. 102 can be reduced to a quadratic equation:(
i0
ic
)β
S1/γ
(
Nfix
S
)2/γ
−
(
Nfix
S
)1/γ
+ 1 = 0.
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(a) When the two functions, the blue dashed line for Eq.
96 and the red line Eq. 97, do not intersect, this system
of equations has no solution. The stability of the sys-
tem is fully determined by the non-network model given
in the Appendix C. The network then has the effect of
delaying the divergence by allowing only a very low rate
of contagion in the region where the two functions are
getting very close one to one another.
(b) By lowering the initial interest rate, i0, from 1%
in 19(a) to 0.5% here, the red solid line of Eq. 97 is
lowered to intersect the blue dashed line of Eq. 96.
The intersections of these lines give the two solutions
of the system. Clearly, looking at the direction of the
arrows on the black dotted evolution curve, one of the
solutions, (Nconv, iconv), is attractive and the system
in the close neighborhood converges to it. The other
solution, (Ndiv, idiv), is repulsive and the arrows are
directed outwards.
Figure 19: The red solid line represents the way the interest rate reacts to the number of companies in distress (Eq.
96) and the blue dashed line represents the number of failures, Eq. 97. Depending on the given structure of the
network and the way the contagion process is initialized, these two lines either intersect (19(b)) or they do not (19(a)).
That means that the system of Eqs. 96 and 97 can either have two solutions, or none.
Solving this quadratic function for (Nfix/S)
1/γ , we get the number of failed companies in the convergent
and divergent fixed points:
Nfix = Nconv/div = S
1±
√
1− 4
(
i0
iC
)β
S1/γ
2
(
i0
iC
)β
S1/γ

γ
(103)
which gives the two curves in the phase space diagrams shown in Figure 22 for Nconv (lilac) and Ndiv
(red). Obviously, when 4
(
i0C
iC
)β
S1/γ = 1, Eq. 103 has only one solution N0C = Nconv = Ndiv = 2
γS .
The corresponding critical interest rate is, from Eq. 97, i0C = i02
αγSγ .
To find the fixed point (N0C , i0C) for the general case, when αβγ 6= 1, we set the derivative of F (Nfix),
as given by Eq. 102, with respect to Nfix to zero, since this will give just one solution for Nfix, being
where Nconv and Ndiv coincide
δF
δNfix
= (αβ + 1/γ)
(
i0
ic
)β
N
αβ+1/γ−1
fix −N1/γ−1fix /γ = 0 (104)(
i0
ic
)β
N
αβ+1/γ
fix =
(
1
αβγ + 1
)
N
1/γ
fix . (105)
ubstituting the value of Nfix from Eq. 105 into Eq. 102 gives an equation for Nfix of this singular fixed
point: (
1
αβγ + 1
)
N
1/γ
fix −N1/γfix + S1/γ = 0. (106)
Rearranging Eq. 106 and substituting in Eq. 97 gives the fixed point (N0C , i0C):
i0C = i0S
α (1 + αβγ)
1/β
(
1 +
1
αβγ
)αγ
(107)
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(a) A realization of the evolution Eq. 110 for the sys-
tem in which αβ < 1. The fixed point defined by the
non network model, (Ncore, icore), is therefore conver-
gent. Then in the small area under and to the left of this
fixed point the number of ponzi companies grows. In
the area which is shaded a light gray color, the network
(as seen from the blue curve) protects a large number of
ponzi companies (susceptible modes) from failing. The
number of failed companies in this area is limited by
the network.
(b) A visualisation of the two sub-models, the number
of failed (blue curve) and the number of ponzi compa-
nies (blue line), of the co-evolution given by Eq.110, for
the system in which αβ > 1. In this example, a process
that starts with the number of ponzi companies just
above the divergent fixed point defined by the non-
network model, (Ndis, idis), and below the divergent
fixed point defined by the network model, (Ndiv, idiv),
is prevented from the contagion/failing of the suscep-
tible nodes (ponzi companies) and the increase of in-
terest rate by the network.
Figure 20: The Minsky accelerator percolation model. According to Eq. 110, the simultaneous evolution of the
number of failed ponzi companies, Nt, according the two previously elaborated models (Eqs. 63 and 94) is necessary
to obtain the Minsky accelerator percolation model. These are represented with the blue dashed line and curve,
respectively. The red line is used for Eq. 64. The actual Nt (on the x-axis) for a given it (on the y-axis) is the one
which is closer to the vertical axis. Therefore it is clear that in the gray shaded areas, the network solution is dominant:
instead of following the growing number of ponzi companies (as the non-network model specifies), the number of failed
ponzi firms declines. Note that the relevant crossing points on the Figures 20(a) and 20(b) are at the same time
representing a horizontal cross-section of the phase diagrams shown in Figures 22(a) and 22(b), respectively.
Figure 21: Figure for finding one value of isafe. The condition for isafe is that Ncore = Ndiv, i.e. that the three
lines representing the three mechanisms – the interest rate setting mechanism it = i0N
α
t (Eq. 64 red line), the
simple mechanism for setting the number of ponzi companies Nt = (it/k)
β (Eq. 63) and the network mechanism for
determining the number of companies discovered as being ponzi (and so in distress) Nt = S[1− (it/iC)β ]−γ (Eq. 94)
– meet at a single point (Nsafe, isafe).
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N0C = S (1 + 1/αβγ)
γ
. (108)
In Figure 20 two examples are given in which one can easily see how the network can have different
impacts on the convergence/divergence of the system. The entire system is perceived as a co-evolution
of three models: the two microscopic models: the bottom-up model (the blue line) and the peer-to-peer
network model (the blue curve) and the macroscopic top-bottom model (the red line). According to Eq.
109, the actual number of failed ponzi companies in the network case is equal to the lesser of the number
of ponzi companies in the system without a network and the number of failed ponzis predicted by the
network model. Once the number of failed ponzi is fixed, then the interest rate is determined as the
minimal interest rate that the two models (the non-network model Eq. 63 and the infinite network model
Eq. 94) predict.
Nfail = min{S[1−Nponzi/NC ]−γ , Nponzi} (109)
Therefore, eliminating NPonzi from 109, the time evolution of the system is reduced to an iterative process
between Nfail
Nt = min{S
[
1− (it/iC)β
]−γ
, (it/k)
β} (110)
and i, Eq. 64 (it+1 = i0N
α
t ).
In Figure 20, the system without taking the network into account is represented by the two straight
lines: the red line that represents the top-bottom macroscopic effect and the blue straight line that
represents the microscopic bottom-up effects. Their intersection is labelled (Ncore, icore) when αβ < 1
and (Ndis, idis) when αβ > 1. The networked system is represented with the red line (macro) and blue
curve (micro). Their intersection defines two fixed points: (Nconv, iconv) and (Ndiv, idiv), regardless of the
values of these parameters. The macroscopic part of the model revises the interest rate according to the
number of failed ponzi companies.
In the visual analysis of Eq. 110, Figure 20, the graphical analysis is not entirely completed: the
bottom-up and the peer-to-peer models are plotted as if they were independent of each other and it is
now up to the reader to determine the minimum and thus the actual solution for the number of failed
ponzi companies, and the final evolution of the process. The end result would contain only one red line,
one blue curved line (a combination of the existing blue line and the blue curve) and one evolution curve
(an example of a completed procedure is given in Figure 21).
Figure 22 gives the final result of the Minsky accelerator model: the prediction of the states of the
system, given the initial number of failed ponzi companies and the initial interest rate. As the previous
analysis has proved, if the initial conditions are equal to one of the fixed points, the initial state will not
change; otherwise, the number of failed ponzi companies and the interest rate will either grow (possibly
leading to a crisis) or decay (stable state), depending on the position of the initial state relative to the
neighbouring fixed points. The lines representing these positions in Figure 22 are the lilac curve for
(Nconv, iconv), the red curve for (Ndiv, idiv), and the blue line for the convergent fixed point (Ncore, icore)
in Figure 22(a) or the divergent fixed point Figure (Ndis, idis) in 22(b); they have been used to construct
the phase diagrams. As can be seen in Eq. 103 with a negative of the square root, as i0 approaches zero
the lilac curve approaches S. The lines are calculated under the assumption: αβγ = 1. A detailed and
descriptive interpretation of the phase diagram when αβ < 1 (Figure 22(a)) is given in the main text and
will be partially and quite technically repeated in the paragraphs that follow. The interpretation of the
diagram when αβ > 1 (Figure 22(b)) is left to the reader.
Minsky accelerator model in terms of ponzi density The same dynamics can be expressed in terms
of the feedback between Nt and ρt, using the relations derived from reordering Eq. 63 and noting that
Nt = ρt/Ntotal:
it = kN
1/β
t = kρ
1/β
t N
1/β
total (111a)
i0 = kN
1/β
0 = kρ
1/β
0 N
1/β
total (111b)
iponzi = kN
1/β
ponzi = kρ
1/β
ponziN
1/β
total (111c)
iC = kN
1/β
C = kρ
1/β
C N
1/β
total. (111d)
The system of equations Eqs. 110 and 64 then becomes:
Nt = min{S
[
1− ρt
ρC
]−γ
, ρtNtotal} (112)
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ρt+1 = ρ0N
αβ
t . (113)
Substituting Eq. 113 into Eq. 112 gives the number of failed companies at the equilibrium fixed points
when there is a network effect:
Nfix = S
[
1− ρ0
ρC
Nαβfix
]−γ
. (114)
Deduction of the formulae for Ncore: When the network effects are not felt, the system is given by the
two Eqs. 63 and 64. The two straight lines representing these equations intersect in a fixed point which
we have labelled (Ncore, icore) when αβ < 1 and (Ndis, idis) when αβ < 1. The position of these points
can be determined by substituting Eq. 64 into Eq. 63, as has already be done in Appendix C, see Eq. 81,
to give:
Ncore = (icore/k)
β (115)
icore = i0N
α. (116)
Substituting for icore gives:
Ncore = (N
αi0/k)
β (117)
N1−αβcore = (i0/k)
β (118)
Ncore = (i0/k)
β/(1−αβ). (119)
This can be translated in terms of ρ, taking into account that ρtotal = 1:
(i0/k)
β = (i0/imax)
β(imax/k)
β = ρ0Ntotal. (120)
So finally:
Ncore = (ρ0Ntotal)
1/(1−αβ)
. (121)
Similarly for the point (Ndis, idis).
Deduction of the formulae for Nsafe and isafe: In order to find the conditions where the three curves
– the red line, the blue line and the blue curve – meet, as shown in Figure 21, we assume that N is large
enough so that N = S[1 − (i/iC)β ]−γ implies, to a good approximation, i = iC . Thus the condition for
the three lines to meet becomes, by substitution in Eqs. 63 and 64:
Nsafe = (iC/k)
β (122)
(which already determines Nsafe) and:
iC = isafeN
α
safe (123)
or
Nsafe = (iC/isafe)
1/α. (124)
Eliminating Nsafe:
(iC/k)
β = (iC/isafe)
1/α (125)
(iC/k)
αβ = (iC/isafe) (126)
isafe = iC(k/iC)
αβ . (127)
Note that this point has been shown in Figure 22 as the intersection of the blue line with the red curve.
In fact the intersection of the blue line with the lilac curve is also a possible position for (Nsafe, isafe), all
be it with a value of isafe that is approximately the same, but with a smaller value for Nsafe. That only
one value is given here is due to the approximation we made that i = ic.
Using the same tricks as above one can translate Eqs. 122 and 127 in terms of ρ:
Nsafe = (iC/k)
β = (iC/imax)
β(imax/k)
β = ρCNtotal (128)
isafe/iC = (k/iC)
αβ (129)
which can be rewritten as:
(ρsafe/ρC)
1/β = (ρCNtotal)
−α (130)
or
ρsafe = ρC(ρCNtotal)
−αβ . (131)
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(a) Phase diagram-like representation of the possible
states of the system with αβ < 1. The red line represents
the fixed point (Ncore, icore). If the starting point defined
by the initial number of ponzi companies and the initial
interest rate falls in the area which is below all the lines,
the system will remain stable: the number of ponzi com-
panies will decay with each iteration. If the initial number
of ponzi companies is greater then S and the (N0, i0) point
is above all the lines, then the number of ponzi companies
with each iteration increases.
(b) The red line represents the fixed points (Ndis, idis) for
αβ > 1. Ndis uses the same formula as Ncore, but its
role is somewhat different: for all starting points (N0, i0)
which fall below the blue line, the number of failed ponzi
companies eventually falls to zero and for all (N0, i0) above
the blue line, the iteration process develops into a crisis. If
however the starting point falls in the area below the red or
the lilac lines, the system is to a great extent protected by
the network and the space that would otherwise be above
the blue line and would lead to a crisis, remains stable.
Figure 22: The plotted lines represent the borderlines of the phase space between the possible phases: crisis
acceleration or deceleration following an initial shock N0, i0. The red and lilac lines represent the fixed
points (Nconv, iconv) and (Ndiv, idiv), respectively, for the given parameters. They are calculated under the
assumption that αβγ = 1.
Analysis of i0-ranges on the phase diagram in Figure 22(a): As the fixed points do not depend on N0
but, aside from parameter values, only on i0, the boundaries between the different phases are parallel to
the x-axis in Figure 22(a). There are three ranges of i0 and two borderline values between these ranges
which correspond to the different levels of the risk that the system may enter the ‘Minsky instability
phase’:
i0 < isafe
In this region the system is safe since then either:
– The point (Ncore, icore) is to the left of the intersection of the blue line, representing the mech-
anism for setting the number of companies that are ponzi Nt = (it/k)
β (Eq. 63), and the blue
curve, representing the network mechanism for determining how many of them are discovered
as being ponzi (and so in distress) Nt = S[1− (it/iC)β ]−γ (Eq. 94) in a figure similar to Figure
21 and also the red line, representing the interest rate setting mechanism it = i0N
α
t (Eq. 97), is
below the meeting point of these blues lines representing the two mechanisms for determining
the number of failed ponzi companies.
– Or the point (Ncore, icore) is to the right of the intersection of the blue line and the red line is
above the blue curve.
Consequently, Ndiv and Ncore do not exist and so the process Eq. 45 converges to Nconv (see Figure
21) and the ‘Minsky instability phase’ does not exist.
i0 = isafe (for definition see Eq.127) the fixed points Ncore and Ndiv coincide (previous paragraph):
Ncore = Ndiv = Nsafe = (iC/k)
β
and the ‘Minsky instability phase’ shrinks to one point.
isafe < i0 < i0C
In this range all three fixed points Nconv < Ndiv < Ncore exist and so do all the phases.
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i0 = i0C (for the definition see Eq. 107) the two solutions Nconv and Ndiv coincide (Eq. 108):
Nconv = Ndiv = N0C = S
(
1 +
1
αβγ
)γ
(132)
and the stable phase shrinks to one point.
i0 > i0C
In this range, the risk of entering an accelerated crisis is very high. The red line, i = i0N
α, is raised
above the blue curve, S
[
1− (i/iC)β
]−γ
, so their intersections, (Nconv, iconv) and (Ndiv, idiv), do not
exist, nor does the ‘stable phase’. In the absence of these fixed points the failure contagion process
45 continues unhindered beyond the percolation threshold. This is the meaning of the part of the
Minsky instability phase which, as seen in the Figure 22(a), would extend to the only fixed point
that remains:
Ncore = (i0/k)
β/(1−αβ).
The Ncore convergent fixed point insures the survival of only the most resilient companies and defines
the very solid core phase in Figure 22(a).
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